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Abstract
In this dissertation, we investigate research gaps still existing in P2P ﬁle-sharing
systems: the necessity of fairness maintenance during the content information
publishing/retrieving process, and the stranger policies on P2P fairness.
First, through a wide range of measurements in the KAD network, we present
the impact of a poorly designed incentive fairness policy on the performance of
looking up content information. The KAD network, designed to help peers pub-
lish and retrieve sharing information, adopts a distributed hash table (DHT) tech-
nology and combines itself into the aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing network. We
develop a distributed measurement framework that employs multiple test nodes
running on the PlanetLab testbed. During the measurements, the routing tables
of around 20,000 peers are crawled and analyzed. More than 3,000,000 pieces of
source location information from the publishing tables of multiple peers are re-
trieved and contacted. Based on these measurements, we show that the routing
table is well maintained, while the maintenance policy for the source-location-
information publishing table is not well designed. Both the current maintenance
schedule for the publishing table and the poor incentive policy on publishing peers
eventually result in the low availability of the publishing table, which accordingly
cause low lookup performance of the KAD network. Moreover, we propose three
possible solutions to address these issues: the self-maintenance scheme with short
period renewal interval, the chunk-based publishing/retrieving scheme, and the
fairness scheme.
Second, using both numerical analyses and agent-based simulations, we evalu-
ate the impact of diﬀerent stranger policies on system performance and fairness.
We explore that the extremely restricting stranger policy brings the best fairness
at a cost of performance degradation. The varying tendency of performance and
fairness under diﬀerent stranger policies are not consistent. A trade-oﬀ exists
between controlling free-riding and maintaining system performance. Thus, P2P
designers are required to tackle strangers carefully according to their individual
design goals. We also show that BitTorrent prefers to maintain fairness with an ex-
tremely restricting stranger policy, while aMule/eMule's fully rewarding stranger
policy promotes free-riders' beneﬁt.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we brieﬂy introduce the P2P ﬁle-sharing systems and their unique
features. After that, we present the fairness challenges in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems
and review the related work. Then, we show the motivation of this thesis and
conclude with our contribution.
1.1 P2P File-Sharing Systems
Peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture is a distributed application architecture that as-
signs services and workloads among peers. P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, as the most
popular application using P2P technology, generate a large amount of the traﬃc
on the current Internet [1]. In a typical P2P ﬁle-sharing system, users are called
peers, and they run P2P client applications to join the system through the In-
ternet. Each user can connect to other peers for exchanging content like movies,
music, and games.
P2P ﬁle-sharing systems employ several unique features, which can help peers
exchange content eﬀectively:
• each peer has dual roles as both server and client,
• the logical structure of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems is decentralized,
• and the management style of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems is self-organized.
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Compared with traditional client-server ﬁle-sharing systems, the dual roles of a
peer bring higher throughput and larger scalability to P2P ﬁle-sharing systems.
In traditional client-server ﬁle-sharing systems like FTP, all clients are just con-
sumers, and they must download content from a certain number of pre-designated
servers. Therefore, client performance will degrade as the number of users in-
creases, since the ﬁxed service throughput must be allocated among all users.
However, in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, each peer acts as both client and server. As
a client, it can download content from other peers; as a server, it can also upload
content to others at the same time. Thus, the increase in the number of users
not only brings larger workloads, but also leads to higher throughput in P2P ﬁle-
sharing systems. The P2P decentralized logical structure avoids the deadly eﬀect
of central service nodes failures and consequently leads to increased robustness.
On the other hand, due to the lack of the central nodes, self-organization manage-
ment style is naturally employed into P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. That is, instead of
centrally collecting global information of the whole system and then using the in-
formation to manage each peer, any peer in a typical P2P ﬁle-sharing system will
individually decide how to exchange content with other peers according to their
own experience. As a result, self-organization also brings additional challenge into
P2P ﬁle-sharing systems like the requirement of maintaining fairness.
1.2 Fairness Challenges in P2P File-Sharing Sys-
tems
Maintaining fairness is necessary in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, because 1) sys-
tem performance fully relies on the cooperation of each peer, and consequently
peers' selﬁsh behavior will reduce system performance, and 2) special peers called
free-riders always exist in the system. Compared with general peers existing
in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system, who obey the P2P principle to act as both service
providers and service consumers, free-riders are only service consumers, who spend
2
Chapter 1 Section 1.3
the downloading resource without any contribution to other peers. Previous re-
search already showed that a large number of free-riders can be discovered in P2P
ﬁle-sharing systems [2]. The popularity of free-riding comes from the decentralized
infrastructure and self-organization of P2P networks. Without central manage-
ment nodes, each free-rider can freely choose to partner any number of peers and
can quickly change partners for avoiding punishment. Obviously, since the sys-
tems performance of P2P ﬁle-sharing networks relies on the cooperation of each
peer, free-riding behavior contributes nothing to system performance; moreover,
it is unfair to contributors and eventually degrades system performance. There-
fore, each P2P ﬁle-sharing system must disincentivize this free-riding behavior and
provide fairness to general peers.
Fairness management in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems is also restricted by its de-
centralized infrastructure and self-organization. Thus, a typical P2P ﬁle-sharing
system usually adopts incentive policies instead of obligatory strategies. The gen-
erous behavior of peers is rewarded by promoting more downloading bandwidth,
and the free-riding behavior is punished with the reduction of the downloading
rate. As monetary payment-based incentive policies face many implementation is-
sues in a typical P2P environment [3], reciprocity-based incentive policies become
the fundamental component of fairness strategies [4, 5]. Under this reciprocity-
based incentive mechanism, shareable content or uploading bandwidth is recog-
nized as goods for trading in the system. A peer can then choose their partners
for content exchange according to their individual current or previous behavior.
Generous partners can obtain higher priority and larger bandwidth than selﬁsh
partners.
1.3 Prior Work on P2P Fairness
The free-riding issue of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems was ﬁrst found in [2], where the
authors showed that around 70% users of Gnutella P2P ﬁle-sharing network [6]
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did not share any ﬁles. The following study in [7] found 85% of peers in Gnutella
were free-riders. Besides Gnutella, free-riders also exist in other popular P2P ﬁle-
sharing systems like BitTorrent and aMule/eMule. The impact of free-riding on
system performance was evaluated in [8, 9, 10].
To restrain the free-riding behavior, the research community suggested and
evaluated incentive fairness policies. A number of studies focused on designing
the reciprocity-based incentive fairness policy in P2P ﬁle-sharing networks. On
one side, researchers tried to maintain system fairness based on global knowledge of
each peer's behavior information. For example, researchers in [11] suggested that
each peer constructed a trust graph covering itself and its target peers, and then
the reputation levels of these target peers were computed through diﬀerent trust
paths. Alternatively in [12], the local reputation scores of each peer's partners
would ﬁrst be computed according to their previous behaviors. After that, their
global reputation values were determined using a centralized computing algorithm,
which calculated the eigenvector of a network trust matrix. In [13], the authors
acted to improve system fairness based on an existing social network. In [14], a
general analytical framework was proposed to help researchers evaluate diﬀerent
incentive strategies of P2P networks.
On the other side, historical information cannot easily be spread and syn-
chronized within a distributed and self-organized P2P system. In reality, P2P
ﬁle-sharing systems tend to employ simpler local information based fairness poli-
cies. For example, aMule/eMule[15, 16] employs a local credit system to maintain
fairness, where a peer, after uploading content to its partners, will be assigned
some credit by these partners, and these credit can only be used in pairs between
this peer and the direct partners in the future. BitTorrent [17] maintains its fair-
ness by using a simple Tit-For-Tat (TFT) incentive policy, where a peer mainly
uploads to others from whom it can download at the same time. However, these
policies were shown not to be robust for maintaining fairness. Free-riders could
even obtain higher download rates than TFT compliant clients [18, 19]. In [20],
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a popular free-riding behavior was also found by crawling aMule/eMule for over
50 days. In [21], the results of real world experiments showed that free-riders in
aMule/eMule can obtain similar downloading rate as general peers.
1.4 Motivation of Research
Due to the importance of fairness for P2P ﬁle-sharing, a large number of related
studies have been conducted. However, the research community needs to investi-
gate several research gaps still existing in two primary areas.
a) The necessity of maintaining fairness during content information pub-
lishing and retrieving processes
Exchanging content in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems includes two fundamental steps:
• the process of publishing/retrieving content information for P2P ﬁle-sharing
networks,
• and the process of exchanging real content with other peers.
While maintaining fairness for content exchange has been widely studied, the
necessity of maintaining fairness for the content information publishing/retrieving
process has been overlooked. The research community should answer the following
questions:
• Do peers need to cooperate during the process of publishing/retrieving con-
tent information? That is, is maintaining fairness necessary in this process?
• What is the performance impact on the publishing/retrieving process which
lacks an eﬀective incentive policy?
With the answers to these questions, P2P designers will develop a deep insight
into the fairness issues of the content information publishing/retrieving process.
Thus, they may conduct more eﬀective fairness policies.
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b) The stranger policies on P2P fairness
When designing a P2P fairness policy, how to eﬀectively deal with strangers has
been overlooked. For any peer, strangers are deﬁned to the peers whose previous
behavior is unknown by this peer. So, strangers for a particular peer can be
categorized into 4 groups:
• legitimate peers who just arrive into the system;
• legitimate peers without any content exchange with this peer;
• free-riders whose free-riding behavior are not known by the peer;
• free-riders who pretend to be strangers by frequently changing their identi-
ties.
Since strangers can be either legitimate peers or free-riders, when an uploader
allocates upload bandwidth, promoting more bandwidth to its strangers may also
provide more beneﬁt to free-riders, while limiting more bandwidth to strangers
may limit beneﬁt to legitimate peers. Therefore, when designing a stranger pol-
icy, restricting strangers is not necessarily better/worse than rewarding strangers
for system performance and fairness. As few quantitative evaluations for diﬀer-
ent stranger policies currently exist in literature, the research community should
answer the following questions:
• How does the treatment policy for strangers aﬀect system performance?
• How does the treatment policy for strangers aﬀect system fairness?
• Does the improved fairness brought by a particular stranger policy also result
in the improvement of system performance?
By answering these questions, the research community may ﬁnd the appropriate
trade-oﬀ between performance and fairness requirements when designing stranger
policies.
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1.5 Thesis Contribution and Organization
We study the existing challenges in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems discussed above, and
we have the following contributions.
In Chapter 3, through a wide range of measurement in the KAD network, we
present the impact of a poorly designed incentive fairness policy on the content
information lookup performance. The KAD network, which is designed to help
peers publish and retrieve sharing content information, adopts a distributed hash
table (DHT) technology and combines itself into the aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing
network. During the measurements, the routing tables of around 20,000 peers are
crawled and analyzed. More than 3,000,000 pieces of source location information
from the publishing tables of multiple peers are retrieved and contacted. Based
on these measurements, we have the following contributions.
1. We discover that the KAD network has a low lookup performance.
2. We develop a distributed measurement framework which employs multiple
test nodes running on the PlanetLab testbed [22]. The entire identity (ID)
space of the KAD network is uniformly separated into multiple parts, each
of which are measured by an individual PlanetLab test node.
3. We show that the maintenance policy of routing table is well designed. The
availability of the routing table is high, and the similarity of routing tables is
low. More than 80% of the entries in this table are connectable. The entries
of routing tables among peers, who are logically close with each other, are
diﬀerent.
4. We discover that the maintenance policy for the source-location-information
publishing table is not well designed. The availability of the publishing table
is low. On average, more than 75% entries in this table are stale and cannot
be connected.
5. We also reveal that more than 75% peers leave the system within one hour
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after publishing their downloaded content into the KAD network.
6. By exploring the implementation of the KAD network, we deduct that both
the current maintenance schedule for the publishing tables and the poor
incentive policy on publishing peers eventually result in the low availability
of the publishing table and accordingly cause poor lookup performance of
the KAD network.
7. To deal with these issues, we propose three possible solutions: the self-
maintenance scheme with short period renewal interval, the chunk-based
publishing/retrieving scheme, and the fairness scheme. Both the strengths
and weaknesses of these solutions are also discussed.
In Chapter 4, we also evaluate the impact of diﬀerent stranger policies on system
performance and fairness using both numerical analyses and agent-based simula-
tions. Followings are the key observations.
1. The extremely restricting stranger policy brings the best fairness at the cost
of the degradation of performance. The extremely rewarding stranger policy
cannot provide the highest performance to the system. Appropriately choos-
ing the intermediate policy can bring the highest performance to the system.
The system performance can be improved when the potential contribution
of general newcomers is quickly promoted, while free-riders could also obtain
beneﬁt.
2. The varying tendency of performance and fairness under diﬀerent stranger
policies are not consistent, and the highest performance and the best fair-
ness of the system cannot be reached simultaneously. Speciﬁcally, when the
system reaches the best fairness, where a very small fraction of uploading
bandwidth is allocated to strangers, free-riders will be signiﬁcantly restricted
and cannot easily stay on the system, while the system performance will be
negatively aﬀected due to the delay of general newcomers' potential contri-
bution. When the system reaches the highest performance where at least
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some part of the uploading bandwidth is allocated to strangers, free-riders
also receive this beneﬁt and survive in the system. Moreover, due to free-
riders surviving at this point, good peers may tend to free-ride, since they are
rational and receive less beneﬁt than free-riders, or they may directly leave
the system due to its unfair treatment. Eventually, these consequences will
negatively aﬀect the system performance. Taking this design dilemma into
account, P2P designers are required to tackle strangers carefully according
to their individual design goals.
3. We conduct cases studies for the current most popular realistic P2P ﬁle-
sharing systems: BitTorrent and aMule/eMule. Based on the agent-based
simulation results, we show that BitTorrent prefers to maintain fairness by
sacriﬁcing its performance, while aMule/eMule's fully rewarding stranger
policy promotes free-riders' beneﬁt. We verify our discovery by both analyz-
ing the TFT incentive policy of BitTorrent and running experiments in the
real aMule/eMule network. Additionally, we simulate the credit incentive
policy in aMule/eMule to verify the inconsistent tendency of performance
and fairness. Finally, we suggest possible alternative improvements for both
of BitTorrent and aMule/eMule.
We organize this dissertation as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the related
background of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. The review includes the structured and
unstructured overlay infrastructures of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems; the most popular
P2P ﬁle-sharing systems BitTorrent and aMule/eMule; the fairness issue of P2P
ﬁle-sharing systems; and the incentive fairness policies. In Chapter 3 and 4, we
provide our foundational contributions of this research. In Chapter 5, we summa-
rize the entire dissertation and point out the possible future work for P2P fairness
design.
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Background
In this chapter, we review the related background for this dissertation. We intro-
duce P2P technologies and P2P unstructured and structured overlay infrastruc-
ture. We present the principle of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems and the most popular
P2P ﬁle-sharing systems: BitTorrant and aMule/eMule. After that, we discuss
the fairness issue in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems and the current corresponding coun-
termeasures.
2.1 P2P Technologies
As a special networking technology, P2P helps a single node build connections with
other nodes through the Internet. These nodes are called peers, and they combine
together to form a logical network called P2P network. Unlike physical networks,
P2P networks have their own logical structured or unstructured topologies.
2.1.1 Main Characteristics of P2P Technologies
P2P networks are designed to provide better performance than traditional client-
server networks. The greatest diﬀerence between client-server networks and P2P
networks is the roles of each node. In a typical client-server network as shown in
Figure 2.1.1, each node can be either a client or a server, but not both. Clients
can only be service consumers, and servers can only be service providers. Usu-
10
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Figure 2.1.2: P2P Infrastructure
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ally, servers are pre-designated and have to stay in the system for a long-term
period; clients have to obtain service from servers, and there are no communica-
tions among clients. In a typical P2P network as shown in Figures 2.1.2, the role
of each node is equal: it is both a client and a server. It can obtain service from
other peers, and it can also provide service to others at the same time. Thus,
communications are distributed among all peers. As a result, the increase in the
number of customers in a client-server network usually leads to the degradation of
the system performance; while the increase in the number of customers in a P2P
network not only brings more workload, it also provides higher service capacity
and larger scalability. Furthermore, since each peer can be a service provider, the
failures of peers in P2P networks have less impact on the system than the failures
of servers in client-server networks. Therefore, the robustness of P2P networks is
also stronger than client-server networks.
2.1.2 P2P Overlay Structure
The logical links among peers in a P2P network create an application level based
overlay network. Peers use diﬀerent methods to create their logical links  to
discover other peers. Depending on these diﬀerent methodologies, people can
divide this overlay network into two main classes: structured P2P networks and
unstructured P2P networks.
2.1.2.1 Structured P2P Networks
Structured P2P networks are normally built by distributed hash table (DHT)
algorithms. The hash table algorithm, used to speed up the lookup process, creates
the relationship between the index key and the real value. In structured P2P
networks, the whole hash table is separated and distributed to all peers. Each
peer is responsible for maintaining its own part of the entire hash table. By
using maintained information, each peer can also iteratively contact any other
peer in the P2P networks. The advantage of structured P2P networks is that it
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Figure 2.1.3: DHT method - Chord
almost guarantees that online peers can be located within a short-period of time,
usually within O(logN), where N is the population of online peers in the system.
Based on how to maintain the neighbors, structured P2P networks have their own
logical topologies. For example, the chord system shown in Figure 2.1.3 creates a
circle logical overlay topology by letting each peer maintain the information of its
successors and predecessors [23]. In the Kademlia network, each peer considers
the whole logical system as an unbalanced binary tree [24].
2.1.2.2 Unstructured P2P Networks
In unstructured P2P networks, peers build connections according to an ad-hoc
style. To discover other peers in unstructured P2P networks, two diﬀerent kinds
of lookup methods are usually adopted: the index server method shown in Figure
2.1.4 and the query ﬂooding method shown in Figure 2.1.5.
• With the index server method, some central nodes, called index servers,
maintain the information of peers. Online peers register themselves on these
central nodes and then update this information after some time. Conse-
quently, this information can also be retrieved by any peer from these index
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Figure 2.1.4: Index server method
servers. However, this server-based method suﬀers from the failures of these
central nodes, so the scalability and robustness of P2P networks cannot be
well extended.
Peer
Peer
Peer
Peer
Peer
Peer
Peer
Figure 2.1.5: Query ﬂooding method
• Another lookup method is based on ﬂooding queries among the system.
When a peer wants to locate another peer, it will send requests to its known
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peers. If these known peers do not have the information of the requested
peer, the known peers will iteratively send the requests to their known peers.
Obviously, this method could be more robust than the index server method.
However, it also introduces a large amount of traﬃc with the ﬂooding queries,
and therefore P2P ﬁle-sharing systems usually limit the ﬂooding scope [6].
However, with this limited ﬂooding method, it cannot be guaranteed that
the searched peer may be located.
2.2 P2P File-Sharing Systems
P2P ﬁle-sharing is the most popular application of P2P technology, which is used
for content exchange among peers and produces the largest traﬃc currently on
the Internet [1]. In the following subsection, we introduce general principles of
P2P ﬁle-sharing systems and the two most popular P2P ﬁle-sharing systems:
aMule/eMule and BitTorrent.
2.2.1 General Principles of P2P File-Sharing Systems
In P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, peers are grouped together for ﬁle exchange. Each
peer in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system normally undertakes two roles: 2) as a service
consumer, the peer downloads content from other peers; 1) as a service provider,
it also uploads content to other peers. Therefore, P2P ﬁle-sharing systems have
the following feature: with the increase in the number of joined peers, who are
both service consumers and service providers, not only the system downloading
workload but also the system uploading capacity increases. When compared with
the traditional client-server ﬁle-sharing infrastructure, P2P distributed feature
brings higher throughput, larger scalability, and stronger robustness to P2P ﬁle-
sharing systems.
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2.2.2 Content Exchange Process in P2P File-Sharing Sys-
tems
In a P2P ﬁle-sharing system, in order to download desired content, each down-
loader must go through two necessary stages:
• locating peers with sharable content;
• connecting the located peer to download content.
Correspondingly, each uploader also needs two steps for completing content ex-
change:
• publishing shareable content;
• selecting downloaders to upload content.
In the following, we review these two stages respectively.
2.2.2.1 Content Information Publishing/Retrieving in P2P File-Sharing
Systems
In order to help uploaders publish content information and downloaders retrieve
content information, the corresponding peers in the system must ﬁrst be discov-
ered. P2P ﬁle-sharing systems build unstructured or structured logical networks
mentioned in Section 2.1 to facilitate this process, i.e., using the index server
method, the ﬂood-query method, or the DHT method to discover peers.
• Index server method: This method can be used for both content publishing
and content retrieving processes. With the index server method, a certain
number of nodes, as servers, are popularly known by peers. To let peers
know the information of servers, this information is usually published out-
of-bound, like published on famous websites. Instead of directly uploading
the whole content into these servers, a peer publishes its shareable content
location information (e.g. this peer's location information) into the servers.
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As a result, other peers can retrieve location information of their desired
content from these index servers, and then directly download the content
from sharing peers. The disadvantage of this index server method is obvious
because it breaks the fully distributed structure of P2P systems by intro-
ducing central nodes. The failures of these central index servers will greatly
aﬀect functionality and robustness of the system. Currently, popular P2P
ﬁle-sharing systems like BitTorrent and aMule/eMule employ an index server
method as one of their content publishing/retrievaling mechanisms.
• Query-ﬂooding method: Query-ﬂooding method, which was adopted by the
Gnutella P2P ﬁle-sharing system [6], helps P2P ﬁle-sharing systems maintain
their fully distributed feature. It is only used to assist peers to look for
content. When a peer wants to retrieve particular content information, the
peer sends requests to its known peers. If these known peers do not hold
the required content, the original request will be forwarded to the other
peers, who are known by these known peers. Under this strategy, each peer
is required to either answer the request, if it holds the content, or forward
the request to its known peers. So, the request has been iteratively ﬂooded
within the P2P network. Compared with the index server method, the
content information does not need to be published anymore by using the
query-ﬂooding method. However, since ﬂooding requests cannot be inﬁnite,
the maximum hops of requests are usually limited [6], and peers could face
the risk of not ﬁnding the content, even though the content really exists in
the system.
• DHT method: The DHT method also maintains the fully distributed feature
of P2P systems. Like the index server method, it can also be used for
both content publishing and content retrieving processes. In a P2P ﬁle-
sharing network using DHT technology, each peer holds a unique identity
by applying a special hash function. When a peer plans to publish some
content information, a hash value has ﬁrst been obtained by hashing the
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information with the same hash function. After that, the hashed content
information is stored onto several peers whose identities are close to the
hash value. The reason for storing onto several peers instead of one peer
is to improve system redundancy and robustness. If a peer later wants to
retrieve this published information, this peer can also ﬁrst obtain the same
hash value by hashing the desirable content information. And then, it can
search diﬀerent parts of the entire distributed hash table to locate peers
who have the closer identities with the hash value, and those peers should
be the peers holding the published information. As each peer must keep its
neighbors' information in the DHT network, maintaining the information of
neighbors can utilize a logical structure of the DHT can as a tree, a circle,
a chain, etc. With this logical structure, peers can iteratively send requests
to neighbors to locate other peers in the system in a relatively short period
time. Currently, aMule/eMule builds a DHT called the KAD network for
facilitating the content publishing and retrieving processes. BitTorrent also
began to combine the DHT functionality into its network.
2.2.2.2 Content Downloading/Uploading in P2P File-Sharing System
After obtaining information of peers who share the desired content, downloaders
will build connections with those peers and begin the downloading process. They
can choose to download content from one single peer, and this may require a
relatively long time period, if the size of content is large. In order to speed up
the download process, they can also choose to download content from multiple
peers simultaneously, and this is generally adopted by modern P2P ﬁle-sharing
systems. To implement this multiple-downloading scheme, the content is usually
separated into multiple same-size parts called chunks. If the downloading content
has multiple chunks, instead of fully downloading it from one peer, the downloader
can simultaneously download diﬀerent chunks from diﬀerent peers. Furthermore,
with the chunk-based method, each downloaded chunk can be uploaded to other
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peers immediately without waiting to obtain the entire ﬁle. After downloading
diﬀerent chunks from diﬀerent peers, the downloader will reorganize those chunks,
and the whole content has been recovered to itsoriginal format.
An uploader also needs to make a decision about how to allocate uploading
bandwidth to downloaders. The uploader can put downloaders into its waiting
queue and assign the entire upload bandwidth to a downloader selected by a
particular policy like ﬁrst in ﬁrst out (FIFO) or round robin. The uploader may
also separate its whole uploading bandwidth into multiple slots and upload to
multiple downloaders at the same time.
2.2.3 Popular P2P File-Sharing Systems
In the following subsection, we introduce the currently most popular P2P ﬁle-
sharing systems: aMule/eMule and BitTorrent.
2.2.3.1 aMule/eMule P2P File-Sharing System
The aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing system is one of the most popular P2P ﬁle-
sharing systems with around one million online users [25]. It is composed of the
aMule application [15], the eMule application [16], and the eDonkey system [26].
aMule is a Linux-based P2P ﬁle-sharing application, and eMule is a Windows-
based one. Edonkey is a network, used by both aMule and eMule, providing the
content publishing/retrieving service from the index servers. We know that in a
general P2P ﬁle-sharing system, when a peer performs a content exchange, this
peer must ﬁrst collect the information of content sources. In aMule/eMule, several
diﬀerent source searching approaches are employed.
• ED2K method: the eDdonkey network is composed of index servers call
ED2K servers. These servers do not hold the real content for sharing. In-
stead, the sources' information (sharing content location information) is pub-
lished on to these ED2K servers by peers who share content in the network.
As a result, the information of those sources can be easily retrieved from
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ED2K servers by any peer. aMule and eMule implement the full function-
ality of the ED2K protocol, which speciﬁes the communication between the
ED2K servers and the P2P ﬁle-sharing clients. Thus, each peer running
aMule/eMule application can easily search for the information of sources
from those ED2K servers.
• KAD method: with the implementation of the DHT function, peers running
the aMule or eMule application also build a DHT network called the KAD
network. In the KAD network, content information can be published and
retrieved with the help of both publishing peers and published peers. Pub-
lishing peers are the source peers with shareable content, and they publish
the content information onto other peers in the KAD network; published
peers are those peers in charge of maintaining the published information. In
the KAD network, each peer needs to maintain its own routing table and
publishing table. Each publishing peer uses its routing table to discover
the corresponding published peers, and then inserts the content location
information into the publishing tables of these published peers. With this
publishing/retrieval methodology, each peer can also use its routing table
to discover published peers and then retrieve needed information from their
publishing tables.
• Source-Exchange method: this method can aid peers obtain more sources.
It assumes that a peer has already obtained some sources from other sources
searching methods like the ED2K mehtod or the KAD method. During the
content exchange process, this peer will continuously ask for more sources
from these already known sources with the Source-Exchange method.
• Passive method: the passive method is an auxiliary method used to obtain
more possible sources. In aMule/eMule, each peer must maintain its knowl-
edge about the whole network. That is, the peer must connect to some other
online peers and make them as its neighbors. The passive method exploits
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this pattern and prescribes that, when building connection with those online
peers, each peer will ask for the connectors whether they can be the sources
of its desired content.
When exchanging real content, peers in aMule/eMule also adopt a chunk-based
content uploading/downloading approach. Each piece of shared content is divided
into equal-sized pieces call chunks (by default the size of each chunk is 9.28MB).
So, both the download capacity and uploading capacity of aMule/eMule can be
improved by this chunk-based exchange process.
2.2.3.2 BitTorrent P2P File-Sharing System
BitTorrent is also one of the most popular P2P ﬁle-sharing systems in the real
world with millions of online users [17]. Same as aMule/eMule, the exchanged ﬁle
in BitTorrents is also divided into multiple same-size chunks (the size of a chunk
is 256KB by default). Peers downloading the same ﬁle are grouped together.
Thus, one grouped peer can exchange desired chunks with other peers in the same
group. Unlike aMule/eMule where sharing content information is published into
its own P2P network, in BitTorrent content information is published from out-
of-band. To implement the out-of-band publication, a .torrent ﬁle related to the
published content must be ﬁrst created. This ﬁle speciﬁes the information about
the communication information of the tracker (the tracker is very similar to the
index server, but it only services for a speciﬁc group), the meta data of the shared
ﬁle, such as ﬁle name and ﬁle length, and the hash value of each chunk. This
.torrent ﬁle is not distributed among BitTorrent's network, but it is published onto
some particular websites or online forums, where users can retrieve the .torrent ﬁle
and pick up the information of the tracker. The out-of-band publishing strategy
simpliﬁes the publishing process in BitTorrent. It also helps BitTorrent avoid some
copyright issues.
After obtaining information of the tracker, the new attended peer will register
itself onto the tracker. In addition, during the content exchange process, each reg-
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istered peer will also periodically update information of their owned chunks onto
the tracker. As the tracker holds the detailed information about which peer holds
which chunks, each downloader can periodically retrieve information of other reg-
istered peers from the tracker and use these located peers as its sources candidates.
2.2.4 Fairness Issue in P2P File-Sharing Systems
Maintaining fairness is necessary in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system due to the existence
of selﬁsh behavior of some peers. In a traditional client-server system, each user
can be safely assumed to be obedient; otherwise the user cannot obtain the pro-
vided service. However, for a typical P2P ﬁle-sharing system, in order to keep
the properties of high throughput, large scalability, and strong robustness, the
fully-distributed and self-organized infrastructure must be adopted to attract as
many peers as possible. That is, peers are allowed to own their identities without
any cost and to attend and leave the system freely. Therefore, the environment of
P2P ﬁle-sharing is highly dynamic and hardly manageable. As a result, exploiting
the diﬃculty of management in such a P2P environment, some peers may attempt
to only consume the uploading bandwidth of other peers in the absence of con-
tributing to others. This kind of peer is called a free-rider, and a large number
of free-riders were discovered in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems lacking the capability
to maintain fairness [2]. Obviously, the free-riding behaviors not only contribute
nothing to system performance, but also brings additional workload to contribu-
tors and eventually degrades system performance. Since system performance of
P2P ﬁle-sharing networks relies on each peer's cooperation, it is vital to alleviate
free-riding behavior through fairness policies.
However, maintaining fairness eﬀectively in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system is chal-
lenging. Maintaining fairness is restricted by the decentralized infrastructure and
self-organization of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. To maintain fairness, it is impracti-
cal to give up the intuitive distributed infrastructure by introducing central control
nodes, and it is also hard to implement a mandatory or monetary payment-based
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fairness schedule due to the high dynamic nature of peers. Thus, reciprocity-based
incentive policies are usually adopted, in which a peer prefers to promote more
downloading bandwidth or higher downloading priority to peers from whom it
formerly obtained beneﬁts. Under this kind of incentive mechanism, a peer can
choose their partners for content exchange according to the each partner's indi-
vidual previous behavior. Generous partners obtain higher priority and larger
bandwidth than free-riding partners. Depending on how to obtain the informa-
tion of previous behavior, the reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms can be sub-
divided into indirect reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms (IRMs) and direct
reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms (DRMs). Under the IRMs, a global rep-
utation level for each peer is normally calculated and distributed. Consequently
the service level of peer A to peer B could depend on the former service level of
B to other peers. Under the DRMs, each peer merely maintains the contribution
information of their former partners. This results in the service level of A to B
depending only on B's previous service level to A. IRMs are widely discussed in
[27, 12, 11, 28], but they are complicated and face some implementation issues
for the current P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, such as how to sychronize information
among a large number of peers within a short time period. On the other hand,
due to the simplicity of DRMs, they are popularly adopted in P2P ﬁle-sharing
networks such as BitTorrent and aMule/eMule.
In the following, we will brieﬂy introduce the fairness policies in BitTorrent
and aMule/eMule.
2.2.4.1 BitTorrent's Fairness Policy
As one of the most popular P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, BitTorrent adopts a TFT
incentive mechanism aiming to reward generous peers and penalize free-riders in
exchanging a single ﬁle. Using TFT incentive policy, an uploader will divide its
entire uploading bandwidth into several equal slots (by default, the number of
slots is 4 according to the oﬃcial BitTorrent speciﬁcation). Each slot will be as-
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signed to a downloader candidate from whom the uploader can obtain data with
the highest downloading rate. Each upload will lasts for 10 seconds, and then the
candidates will be re-selected according to their latest measured uploading rates
to the uploader. Additionally, every 30 seconds the uploader runs an optimistic
unchoking strategy [17] to replace one of the current downloaders with a randomly
selected downloader candidate, no matter whether or not this candidate has ex-
changed content with the uploader earlier. The goal of this unchoking strategy is
to discover better potential partners and promote newcomers.
Even though the TFT policy tries to maintain fairness, it was shown not to be
eﬀective. According to recent researches [18, 19], Free-riders could survive in Bit-
Torrent, and they could even obtain higher download rates than TFT compliant
clients. This is mainly because free-riders are able to retrieve as many as possi-
ble sources from the tracker. After that, by exploiting the optimistic unchoking
strategy, they can obtain enough downloading bandwidth from these sources.
2.2.4.2 aMule/eMule 's Fairness Policy
As another very popular P2P ﬁle-sharing system, aMule/eMule attempts to main-
tain its fairness with a local credit system [16]. The design goal of the credit system
is to reward sharing behavior. Speciﬁcally, if peer A uploaded some content to
peer B, peer B would assign some credit to peer A. When peer A later wants
to download desired content from peer B, using the assigned credit, peer A will
be given higher priority service from peer B than B's other partners having less
credit. As the content exchange process in aMule/eMule is a chunk-based process,
the credit operation can also be performed during a single chunk exchange. Thus,
peers with only one chunk can still earn credit from their service recipients, and
peers can use credits for downloading one chunk. In addition, unlike the TFT
policy in BitTorrent which can only be applied on a single ﬁle exchange process,
the credit system in aMule/eMule tries to deal with multiple ﬁle-exchange situa-
tions. To implement this goal, the credit system regulates that the unconsumed
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credits can reside with peers for several months [16], so peers can use the credits
when they download multiple ﬁles in the future. Another noticeable feature of this
credit system is that credit operations only exist between the service provider and
its direct service recipients. In other words, the credit information exists locally
and is not spread among other peers in the system.
The credit system in aMule/eMule also has its weaknesses. For example, the
eﬃciency of the credit system may be low, as the credit information is not spread
among all the peers. There is no explicit fairness policy to deal with free-riding
behavior, so the free-riders may easily obtain beneﬁts. These kinds of issues were
approved by several research works [20, 21], which show that free-riding behavior
is popular in aMule/eMule and free-riders can obtain high downloading rates.
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Lookup Performance Deﬁciencies in
the KAD Network
In this chapter, we present the impact of a poorly designed incentive fairness policy
on content information lookup performance. We run a wide-range measurement
on the KAD network [29], which adopts a DHT technology and combines itself into
aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing network. The KAD network, as one of the largest
DHTs in the real world, is designed to help peers publish and retrieve sharing
content information with the routing table and publishing table technology. Our
measurements show that even though the routing table is well maintained, the
current refresh scheme of the publishing table and the lack of the eﬀective incentive
policy cause lookup performance deﬁciency. To mitigate this problem, we propose
three diﬀerent modiﬁcations and analyze their advantages and weaknesses in the
end.
3.1 Introduction
To publish and retrieve content eﬃciently in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, structured
methods based on a DHT technology has been widely proposed [23, 30, 24, 31].
In reality, there is one DHT-based network being widely deployed in aMule/eMule
P2P ﬁle-sharing systems [32, 16]  the KAD network. According to the work of
26
Chapter 3 Section 3.1
Steiner et al. [33], the size of the KAD network is over one million online peers.
Since both aMule and eMule have implemented the full functionality of the KAD
network, each peer in aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing system is a peer in the KAD
network by default. Consequently, the credit system in aMule/eMule is also re-
sponsible for maintaining the fairness of the KAD network. In the KAD network,
publishing and retrieving content information needs the help of publishing peers
and published peers. Publishing peers are the peers with shareable content who
publish the content information on to particular peers, and published peers are
those particular peers in charge of maintaining the published information. Each
publishing peer (the uploader) uses its routing table to discover the corresponding
published peers, and then inserts the content information (e.g., the content loca-
tion, name, size, etc.), into the publishing tables of these published peers. Each
downloader can also use its routing table to discover published peers, and then
retrieve needed information from their publishing tables.
In this chapter, we thoroughly study the lookup performance of the KAD net-
work by running multiple measurement tests in real world. Previous measurement
studies [19, 25, 34, 35] usually tested the KAD network from the perspective of a
single client. Moreover, due to the huge size of the KAD network, they usually
measured a speciﬁc aspect of the whole KAD network. In contrast, we measure
the whole KAD network through using multiple test nodes. During the measure-
ments, the routing tables of around 20,000 peers are crawled and analyzed. More
than 3,000,000 pieces of source location information from the publishing tables
of multiple peers are retrieved and contacted. Based on these measurements, we
have the following contributions.
1. We show that the lookup eﬃciency of the KAD network is low. In contrast
to other content searching mechanisms (e.g., the Source-Exchange method
and the Passive method) employed in aMule/eMule, little useful content
location information can be retrieved from the KAD network.
2. We develop a distributed measurement framework which employs multiple
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test nodes running on the PlanetLab testbed [22]. The entire identity (ID)
space of the KAD network is uniformly separated into multiple parts, each
of which are measured by an individual PlanetLab test node. Therefore,
diﬀerent from previous works, our tests provide more reliable results because
of the measurement of the entire KAD network.
3. We show that the maintenance policy of the routing table is well designed.
The availability of the routing table is high. That is, more than 80% of the
entries in this table are connectable. Furthermore, the entries of routing
tables among peers, who are logically close to each other, are diﬀerent, and
this causes these routing tables to have low similarity or large diversity.
4. We discover that the maintenance policy of the source-location-information
publishing table is not well designed. The availability of the publishing table
is low. On average, more than 75% entries in this table are stale and cannot
be connected.
5. We also reveal that more than 75% peers leave the system within one hour
after publishing their downloaded content into the KAD network.
6. By exploring the implementation of the KAD network, we conclude that
both the current maintenance schedule for the publishing table and the poor
incentive policy (the credit system) on publishing peers eventually result in
the low availability of the publishing tables, which accordingly cause poor
lookup performance of the KAD network.
7. We propose three possible solutions to address these issues: the self-maintenance
scheme with short period renewal interval, the chunk-based publishing/retrieving
scheme, and the fairness scheme. The strengths and weaknesses of these so-
lutions are also discussed.
To improve the performance of KAD network, previous works [34, 36] mainly
focused on how to deal with published peers more eﬃciently. However, to our
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knowledge, the impact of the incentive policy on publishing peers has not been
analyzed until this work.
3.2 Background of The KAD Network
In this section, we introduce the related background knowledge on the KAD net-
work. The KAD network is a DHT network based on the Kademlia algorithm
[24]. With the Kademlia algorithm, peers in the aMule/eMule ﬁle-sharing net-
work cooperate together to build a structured overlay network for publishing and
retrieving content information. In the KAD network, peers choose their neighbors
according to the KAD logical distance. Each peer maintains the information of
neighbors by its own routing table. To help peers locate shareable content from
the KAD network, uploaders publish the information of their shareable content
on to publishing tables, and downloaders can also retrieve this information from
the publishing tables.
3.2.1 KAD Logical Distances
To recognize distinctive peers in the KAD network, each peer is assigned a unique
identity, which is called the KAD Identity (KID). By default, the KID of each peer
is generated by the peer itself using a speciﬁc hash function when it ﬁrst joins the
system. Since the KID is 128-bit long, the whole KID name space can theoretically
cover a total number of 2128 diﬀerent peers. Following the Kademlia algorithm, the
logical distances among peers can be calculated by bitwise Exclusive-OR (XOR)
operation on their KIDs. A larger value of XOR result represents a longer logical
distance when compared to a smaller value of XOR result. For example, consid-
ering a 4-bit long KAD name space where peer A, B, and C's KIDs are 1010,
0101, and 1100 respectively. With the bitwise XOR operation, the logical dis-
tances between A and B is 1111 and between A and C is 0110. Consequently, C
is recognized logically closer to A than B under this KID name space.
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Each published item in the KAD network is also assigned a 128-bit long iden-
tity. Thus, the logical distance operations are also used to decide where the
publishing items will be published and then be retrieved. Like the KID of each
peer, the identity of a published item can be created by hashing its meta data,
such as the content name, the content type, etc. We will discuss these publishing
and retrieving processes in detail in the following subsection.
3.2.2 Routing Table and Publishing Tables
Since the KAD network is fully distributed and self-managing, each peer in the
KAD network individually maintains a routing table for its knowledge on other
peers. The entries in the table are the connecting information of its known peers
(the neighbors), such as KIDs of these peers, these known peers' IP addresses, UDP
ports, TCP ports, etc. The logical structure of a peer's routing table is represented
by a binary tree as shown in Figure 3.2.1. Each level of the tree corresponds to
one bit of the KID. Theoretically, the tree's height can be extended to 128 levels
corresponding to the total length of the KID. Connecting information of peers is
collected into the leaf nodes of the tree, and these leaf nodes are named buckets.
The KIDs of the peers belonging to a bucket at a speciﬁc level will have the same
preﬁx bits until that level. For instance, the KIDs of peers within a same bucket
in level 10 have the same 10 preﬁx bits. A bucket may hold at most 10 entries,
beyond which the bucket must be split into two buckets in the next level for
holding more information. Thus, for a bucket in level 10, if more than 10 peers
belonging to this bucket are known, the level 10 bucket will be split into 2 buckets
in level 11.
The position of known peers are not directly assigned into the binary tree
according to their KIDs. Instead, each entry's position in the binary tree is decided
by its XOR distance from the routing table's owner. That is, peers, belonging to
the left branch at a speciﬁc level of the binary tree, have a diﬀerent corresponding
bit from the routing table's owner, while peers on the right branch have the same
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Figure 3.2.1: Logical structure of the routing table. X represents the rest bits
corresponding bit. In other words, the closer to the most left part a peer's position
in the tree is, the further from the routing table owner this peer is, while the closer
to the most right part a peer's position in the tree is, the closer to the routing
table owner this peer is. For instance, considering the above example: peer A is
the routing table's owner, and a bucket of its routing table in level 10 is split into
2 buckets in level 11. The bucket in the left side of the level 11 holds peers whose
11th bit of KID is diﬀerent from the 11th bit of A's KID, and the other bucket in
the right side holds peers whose 11th bit of KID is the same as the 11th bit of A's
KID. However, peers in both buckets still have the same 10 preﬁx bits.
It is impractical and unnecessary for each peer to maintain the information of
all other peers within its routing table. Otherwise, the size of the routing table will
be extremely large due to millions of online peers in the KAD network, and the
routing table must be refreshed frequently because of the high dynamic behavior
of peers. In reality, each peer in the KAD network is only required to maintain
information from more peers with a closer match of KIDs to its KID and maintain
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fewer peers whose KIDs are farther away. With this regulation, the binary tree
 the logical structure of the routing table  becomes unbalanced. That is, the
number of leaf nodes on the left-hand branch of the tree is far less than the number
of leaf nodes on the right-hand branch. In addition, there are no buckets in the
levels from 0 to 3. Otherwise, these buckets must be split soon with the growing
knowledge of the entire network. The left-hand branch of the whole tree shown in
Figure 3.2.1(a), which holds peers that are logically far from the routing table's
owner, always stops at level 4. This regulation leads the left-hand branch of the
whole tree to hold a total of 8 buckets and a total amount of 80 peers at most
(the ﬁrst 4 bits of the XOR distances from the owner of the routing table are also
shown in Figure 3.2.1(a)). These 8 buckets cannot be split into the next level.
For the right-hand branch shown in Figure 3.2.1(b), there are 3 buckets in level
4. Beginning from level 5, the 5 left-most buckets in each level cannot be split
anymore; while each of the other 5 right-most buckets can be split into the next
level, if more than 10 peers in its range are known.
We know that there are around one million online users in the KAD network,
and the number can be roughly represented by 2^20. Thus, a binary tree with a
total of 20 levels can hold all of the peers within the KAD network. When ap-
plying the 20 levels to this particular structure of the binary tree, we can roughly
calculate the total number of peers npthat can actually be held in a routing table
with the following equation:
np = (8 + 3 + 5× 15 + 10)× 10 = 960. (3.2.1)
The formula within the braces calculate the total number of buckets, where
the number 8 + 3 represents the total buckets in the ﬁrst to 4th levels. 5 × 15
represents that there are 5 buckets in each of the following 5th to 19th levels,
and the last 20th level has 10 buckets and is represented by the number 10. The
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other multiplier 10 represents the maximum number of peers in each bucket. As
a result, each peer's routing table keeps the information of less than 1000 peers.
With the help of this special unbalanced tree structure of the routing table, a
peer can easily locate the connecting information of any peer, even though this
information does not exist in its current routing table. By using the routing table,
the lookup process for a particular peer can be described as follows.
• When peer A wants to connect to another online peer B, A ﬁrst calculates
its logical distance from B, and then looks up the corresponding bucket from
its routing table. If B is close to A, the probability of ﬁnding B is high since
A knows more peers around itself; otherwise, the probability of ﬁnding B is
low.
• If peer B is not found from peer A's own routing table, A will do the fol-
lowing. A searches for peers from its routing table who have the longest
preﬁx-matching bits with B, and then sends lookup requests to these peers.
These peers receiving the requests will run the same lookup process. They
either ﬁnd the information of B in their routing tables and reply this infor-
mation back to A, or they retrieve additional peers much closer to B from
their routing tables and reply them back to A.
• When peer A receives those closer peers, iteratively, A sends requests to
those peers again until A can obtain the connecting information of B.
Maintaining the routing table includes adding new peers and removing stale peers.
Each peer can obtain the information of new peers, either when these new peers
directly send requests to it; or when the peer requires its known peers to send the
information of more peers back to it and some of sent peers are unknown to it.
On the other hand, by periodically verifying the online status of each peer, the
information of stale peers in the routing table can also be removed.
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3.2.3 Publishing and Retrieving Processes
Publishing the entire content into other peers could bring a large amount of net-
work traﬃc into the KAD network. Therefore, uploaders only publish the related
content location information into the KAD network, and consequently download-
ers only retrieve this information from the KAD network. As mentioned in previ-
ous subsection, each content location information has a 128-bit long identity. With
the hash table technique, the location information is the value, and the identity
is used as the corresponding key. When a peer wants to share some content, both
the content location information (e.g., the peer's IP address, its TCP and UDP
ports) and its corresponding identity are published onto peers from the KAD net-
work. However, instead of publishing the information on to randomly selected
peers, this information will be published on to some particular online peers whose
KIDs have enough preﬁx-matching bits with the identity of the publishing infor-
mation (16 bits by default). Obviously, this publication approach also simpliﬁes
the lookup process of the KAD network, because in order to retrieve a needed con-
tent, downloaders just need to search for the peers whose KIDs are close enough
to the identity of the content information.
During the publishing or retrieving process in the KAD network, each peer
may act two diﬀerent roles: a publishing peer or a published peer.
• A publishing peer is the peer who plans to publish its shareable content
information onto the KAD network. So a publishing peer normally is an
uploader of a P2P ﬁle-sharing system.
• A published peer is the peer who keeps the published content information
for future retrieval by other peers, and the published peer can be either an
uploader or a downloader in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system.
In order to serve the publishing/retrieving process, each peer, as both a potentially
published and publishing peer in the KAD network, must maintain its routing
table and publishing table. Since in theory any online peer can be found through
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the routing table, the routing table is also used to locate the exact published peers.
After the published peers have been found, the exact information about how to
ﬁnd the real content location will be retrieved from their publishing tables. The
processes of publishing and retrieving content information are shown in Figure
3.2.2. The dotted lines shown in Figure 3.2.2 represent the publishing process.
Publishing TableFinger Table
Finger Table
Sharing Content
Publishing 
Peer
Published 
Peer
KAD User
1
2
3
4
5
6
Publish Process:
Retrieve Process:
Figure 3.2.2: Publishing and retrieval processes
• When a peer publishes its shareable content location information with an
identity k, this peer will select several published peers in its routing table
or iteratively from routing tables of other peers whose KIDs have enough
preﬁx-matching bits with k. The set of these peers is deﬁned as a tolerance
zone of k (step 1).
• After that, the peer inserts the identity k and its location information (e.g.,
its own IP address, transmission ports, etc.) into the publishing tables of
the published peers (step 2).
The solid lines shown in Figure 3.2.2 represent the retrieving process.
• When a user wants to download the same content, equivalently, this user
will either look up its own routing table or iteratively request other known
peers to obtain the information of corresponding published peers within the
same tolerance zone of k (step 3).
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• After that, the user sends requests to these corresponding peers (step 4).
• These corresponding peers will search their local publishing tables, retrieve
the content location information, and reply them back to the user (step 5).
• With the received location information, the user can ﬁnally connect to the
publishing peers and conduct a downloading process (step 6).
3.3 Related Work
The KAD network is one of the largest deployed DHT networks integrated into
the aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing system [15, 16] with millions of users [33]. Its
implementation is based on the Kademlia algorithm [24], which uses the binary
tree as its logic structure of the routing table and uses the XOR operation to
calculate the logic distance among peers. Due to its large deployment, the research
community has shown great interest in the KAD network.
Brunner et al. [29] presented a detailed analysis on the implementation of
the KAD network in his master thesis. This thesis introduced the communication
protocol of the KAD network, the logical structure of the routing table, the lookup
process, etc. All of these analyses provided researchers a deep insight into the KAD
network.
Memon et al. [37] developed a measurement tool that could accurately monitor
the KAD traﬃc. In order to measure the whole DHT network, previous measure-
ment tools were required to insert a large number of monitor peers into the system.
Thus, the proper pattern of the DHT will be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by these moni-
tor tools. However, Memon designed a monitor application that only replied to a
limited number of targeted peers, which made the monitor invisible to most peers
and consequently reduced the impact on the measured system.
Steiner et al. [38] discussed the possible auxiliary usage of the KAD network.
For example, as peers could join and leave the KAD network freely, a Sybil attack
[39] could be easily implemented by introducing a large number of malicious peers.
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Furthermore, misusing the KAD network would easily conduct a DDOS attack.
On the other hand, due to the open feature of the KAD network, it was a rare
research platform with millions of online nodes for studying a distributed system.
The KAD network could also be used to study how to deal with a Sybil attack
and a DDOS attack [40].
Steiner et al. [41] also discovered several very interested behaviors of peers
in the KAD network by their measurement study. For example, there existed a
heavy-tailed distribution for the session length of peers. Some sessions sustain
for multiple days, while others were over within hours. The availability of peers
changed day by day and hour by hour. The KIDs were changed by peers frequently.
Peers were distributed among diﬀerent geographical regions such as China, Europe,
Brazil, etc.
Stutzbach et al. [34] developed a tool called kFetch to measure the accuracy
of the routing table. kFetch randomly chose an online peer in the KAD network
and crawled its entire routing table and veriﬁed the online status of each entry.
However, Stutzbach's method had the disadvantage that this measurement was
issued from a single node, and the whole picture of the KAD network could not
be easily obtained. According to the measurement results, about 90% of entries of
a routing table were fresh. After that, Stutzbach proposed to improve the lookup
performance by using a parallel lookup and increasing the number of published
peers.
Steiner et al. [36] ﬁrst analytically modeled the content information pub-
lishing/retrieving process. They thoroughly studied the impact of some design
parameters like the number of requests for published peers and the number of
actual published peers. With the measurement, they evaluated the latency of the
lookup process under these diﬀerent parameters. In the end, the authors suggested
to reduce the lookup latency by adaptively adjusting the related parameters for
published peers.
Kang et al. [42] discovered the lookup issue that users can only ﬁnd few
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published peers in the KAD network. They measured the KAD network through
a modiﬁed client and found a high similarity of the routing tables belonging to
peers close to each other. However, as their measurement method was not detailed,
their thinking about high similarity among routing tables causing the poor lookup
performance was inconvincible.
In conclusion, previous works tried to improve the lookup performance of KAD
network by dealing with published peers more eﬃciently. However, the usage of the
publishing peers was ignored, and the impact of the incentive policies on system
performance was not addressed until this work.
Compared to previous measurement studies, we believe that our work measures
the whole KAD network by adapting a distributed measurement framework via
the PlanetLab testbed in the ﬁrst time. We are also the ﬁrst to analyze the
publishing tables in the KAD network and to reveal the key factors that aﬀect the
KAD lookup performance: the current maintenance scheme for publishing tables
and the lack of an eﬀecitve incentive policy on publishing peers.
3.4 Measurement-Based Analysis
In this section, we ﬁrst introduce our work that measures the lookup performance
of the KAD network from a user's perspective. Then, we investigate the mainte-
nance of both the routing table and the publishing table with real world measure-
ments.
3.4.1 Lookup Performance of the KAD Network
To explore the lookup performance of the KAD network, we ﬁrst conduct a mea-
surement from the client's viewpoint in the real world. In aMule/eMule, each
peer searches sources information with 4 diﬀerent methods: the ED2K method,
the KAD method, the Source-Exchange method, and the Passive method. We try
to measure the eﬃciency of searching sources' information from the KAD network
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by comparing it with other three methods.
We chose a popular P2P client applicationeMule v0.49c and install it on a
typical PC with a 100Mb Internet connection. This peer was required to run as
a general peer aiming to download its desired content. Of course, it uploaded
its obtained chunks at the same time by following the content exchange rule. To
download each piece of desired content, this peer joined aMule/eMule network
and looked up related sources by these 4 sources information searching methods.
the ED2K method only provides sources at the beginning of search, while the
KAD method, the Source-Exchange method and the Passive method can discover
additional sources during the downloading process. We let this peer complete
the whole downloading process for each content. After downloading one piece of
content, the peer left the system, chose another piece of desired content and ran
the downloading process again. During each downloading, we recorded the number
of useful sources coming from diﬀerent source information searching methods. In
addition, we selected the downloaded content from a large range of popular, but
non-copyright types like audio, video, Linux ISO-distributions, etc. The size of
the content also varied from several MBs to thousands of MBs. This measurement
took place over more than two months beginning at Aug. 2009. During the entire
measurement, this peer downloaded over 100GB of content.
Our measurement result is shown in Figure 3.4.1. For each downloading of
content, our tested peer receives 267 useful sources on average. Due to the copy-
right issue, the current client application does not publish information on to the
ED2K servers. Thus, the ED2K method provides few useful sources. However,
while the Source-Exchange method and the Passive method together provide 95%
of useful sources, the KAD network only provides much fewer sources' information
in comparison. As the KAD network is based on DHT technology that has been
approved with high usability, apparently, we must ask what the reasons are for
this low lookup performance of the KAD network. Considering the key roles of the
routing table and the publishing table on the lookup process of the KAD network,
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Figure 3.4.1: Received average sources information from diﬀerent source-lookup
methods
Table 3.1: Structure of routing table
Name Description
Entry_ID 128-bit identity (KID) of the entry
Distance the distance between this entry and the owner of the routing table
Entry_IP IP address of the source
Entry_TCP TCP port of the entry, it is used for content exchange
Entry_UDP UDP port of the entry, it is used for KAD communication
we are motivated to explore their performance.
3.4.2 The Routing Table Measurement
The routing table is responsible for maintaining the information of online peers.
The structure of a routing table is shown in Table 3.1. During publishing and
retrieving processes, it is used to locate the related published peers. Thus, a
poorly maintained routing table may lead to the poor lookup performance of the
KAD network. For example, if the routing table is full of stale entries, uploaders
may not locate enough online published peers for publishing, and downloaders
may not ﬁnd online published peers for retrieving. Under this kind of situation,
we consider the availability of the routing table is low.
Additionally, there exists another subtle situation. When an uploader tries to
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publish its content, the uploader may not be able to ﬁnd the corresponding peers
directly in its own routing table. Instead, the uploader will send requests to a group
of peers whose KIDs are closest to the identity of the content. This group is deﬁned
as a search tolerance zone, and the default number of peers in the group is 3. The
group of peers continuously searches closers in their own routing tables and may
reply closers from their search tolerance zones to the uploader. Then the uploader
will send requests to these replied peers. This process is iteratively sustained until
the uploader ﬁnds published peers whose KIDs are close enough to the identity of
the content. After that, the uploader will publish content information on to these
found peers. Similarly, downloaders must locate the published peers by performing
the same steps. If peers within a search tolerance zone have a large amount of
same entries among their routing tables (high similarity), their returned peers to
the requestors will be the same. Thus, even though many peers, whose KIDs
are close enough to the identity of the content, may exist in the KAD network,
uploaders/downloaders can only obtain a small part of those peers due to this
high similarity. Since uploaders and downloaders maintain their routing tables
independently, their ﬁnally located peers may not be the same. As a result, the
downloaders cannot ﬁnd the exactly published peers, and consequently the lookup
performance becomes ineﬃcient. Kang et al.[42] measured the similarity of the
routing tables, and they believed that a high value of similarity exists, and this
leads to the poor lookup performance of the KAD network.
3.4.2.1 Measurement Metrics
To verify these potential causes, we introduce two measurement metrics: the avail-
ability Fa(t) and the similarity Fs(t) of the routing table. To calculate Fa, we let
nf and nl represent the total number of entries and the total number of the living
nodes in a routing table respectively, the availability Fa of a routing table at a
speciﬁc measurement time equals:
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Fa =
nl
nf
. (3.4.1)
As a result, a high value of Fa usually indicates that the entries in a routing
table have high availability, and accordingly the routing table is well maintained.
Similarly, to measure the similarity Fs among m peers belonging to a speciﬁc
search tolerance zone at a particular measurement time, we denote nf (i) as the
total number of entries in peer i's routing table and ns as the total number of the
same items among all routing tables in all m peers. Therefore, the similarity Fs of
a group of m peers can be deﬁned as the total number of the same entries in the
routing tables of these m peers divided by the average number of entries in these
routing tables:
Fs =
ns
m∑
i=1
nf (i)/m
. (3.4.2)
Considering the impact of this similarity on lookup performance, the smaller
the value of Fs, the better the routing table is maintained for lookup.
3.4.2.2 Measurement Methodology
We build a distributed measurement framework and deploy it on to multiple nodes
from the PlanetLab testbed. Previous measurement studies [19, 25, 34, 35] inves-
tigated the KAD network from the viewpoint of a single client. This client was
inserted into the real KAD network and either actively crawled other peers or
passively monitored the communication traﬃc. However, due to the existence of
millions of online peers, these measurements only measured a speciﬁc aspect of
the whole system. Thus, their measurement results may not disclose the charac-
teristics of the KAD network fully and accurately. In contrast, our measurement
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framework can test diﬀerent parts of the KAD network simultaneously. Conse-
quently, we believe our measurement results are more accurate. We uniformly
separate the entire KID name space into 16 parts. The KIDs of all peers in each
part have the same most signiﬁcant four bits and diﬀerent 124 remaining bits,
while the peers belonging to diﬀerent parts have the KIDs with diﬀerent most
signiﬁcant four bits. Each PlanetLab node is responsible for measuring a single
part.
We develop two measurement applications: KADmon and RoutingTCrawl.
KADmon is a customized KAD client by modifying a popular aMule client appli-
cation  aMule v2.26, as our monitors. RoutingTCrawl, which is responsible for
crawling the routing table of measured peers and calculating the corresponding
Fa and Fs, is a crawl application developed with Python [43]. Both of these ap-
plications are installed on 16 diﬀerent PlanetLab nodes. The most signiﬁcant four
bits, among the total 128-bit long KID of each node, are uniquely assigned from
0, 1, 2...... E, F, while the 124 remaining bits are randomly generated. Therefore,
each node can measure a single part of the whole KAD network. During the mea-
surement, each PlanetLab node joins the KAD network by running KADmon and
maintains their routing table accordingly. To reduce the impact of the test on the
real system, these PlanetLab monitors neither download content from any other
peers nor share content with them. On the other hand, RoutingTCrawl veriﬁes
the online status of each entry from the routing table of the monitor via Ping-Pong
requests (see the appendix B for detail). If the corresponding peer is online, its
whole routing table is crawled, and the online status of each entry in its routing
table is tested with the corresponding Ping-Pong requests.
How to crawl the routing table is minimally discussed in previous work [42, 33,
44]. However, a poor crawling method may introduce unnecessary measurement
traﬃc and inaccurate measurement results. We present our routing table crawling
method shown in Algorithm 1 in detail. In order to get more peers' information,
each peer can send Kademlia-Request packets [29] to other peers in the KAD net-
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Algorithm 1 Crawling routing Table
Data:
list: requestList=generated requests packets
list: targetList=peers retrieved from a routing table
list: livingList=veriﬁed online peers
hash(128): KID=peer's KID
timestamp: t=timeout
int: retrycount=# of retry when timeout
int: parallelcount=# of requests in parallel
Initialization:
/*according to the crawled peer's KID*/
targetList=generateTargetKIDs( )
/*according to the targetkidList*/
requestList=generateRequests( )
Test:
for each entry in requestList, do in parallel
send request to the target peer
if received response, then
add to the livingList
else if no response and timeout then
if retrycount>0 then
retrycount-1
send request again
wait for response
else
mark the peer oine
/*livingList/targetList*/
calculate availability Fa
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work. To answer this request, the information of up to 11 peers is added into the
corresponding reply message according to the KAD communication protocol. As
the maximum number of entries within one bucket is 10, by carefully choosing the
KID, our crawler can retrieve an entire bucket by sending one single Kademlia-
Request packet. On the other hand, according to the discussion in the background
section, each peer's routing table includes the information of less than 1000 peers
(our measurements presented below show that on average each routing table holds
the information of less than 600 peers). This also helps us design a more eﬃcient
crawler. That is, by sending less than 100 carefully created Kadmelia-Request
packets in parallel, our crawler can retrieve the whole routing table of any peer
within one minute. Additionally, KAD messages are transmitted by UDP packets,
and both request packets and reply packets can be lost during the transmission.
In order to ensure that a tested peer is oine, our crawler implements a retrans-
mission mechanism that can ﬁlter out the lost packet situation. Moreover, by
employing a multi-threading method, our crawler can test the routing tables of
multiple peers at the same time. This also speeds up the measurement process and
brings more accurate results when required to measure a large number of peers in
a short time period.
3.4.2.3 Routing Table's Availability Measurement
We ﬁrst ran our PlanetLab monitors KADmon to collect the information of enough
tested peers. To obtain a uniﬁed perspective of the KAD network, this initial pro-
cess on each PlanetLab node was both performed at the same time and terminated
after 24 hours. After that, the RoutingTCrawl application at each monitor node
was called immediately, and this application retrieved the whole routing table of
the monitor and crawl each obtained peer from the table. Around six thousand
peers, distributed among the entire KID name space, were crawled. Every entry
of the routing table of each crawled peer was retrieved, and the online status of
each retrieved peer was tested.
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The measured data is shown in Table 3.2. Figure 3.4.2(a) shows the average
values of availability Fa for each of these 16 diﬀerent aspects of the KID name
space. No signiﬁcantly diﬀerent values of Fa exist among these 16 parts. As the
histogram and the CDF of Fa shown in Figure 3.4.2(b) and 3.4.2(c) respectively,
there are more than 80% of living peers in the routing table during the measure-
ments. With this high availability, users can ﬁnd their needed online peers from
the routing tables for their publication/retrieval. This high availability of the
routing table beneﬁts from the current maintaining schedule of the routing table,
with which each bucket is refreshed every minute and stale peers are removed at
the same time. In conclusion for this measurement, the availability of the routing
table is not an issue for the lookup performance.
Table 3.2: Measurement data for routing table's availability
Data Value
Total Number of Crawled
Peers
5985
Average Number of Entries 549
Average Availability Fa 0.819
Standard Deviation of Fa 0.050
3.4.2.4 Routing Tables' Similarity Measurement
Kang et al. [42] measured the routing tables between two peers within a 16-bit
search tolerance zone and indicated that those routing tables have a high similarity
of 70%. They empirically selected the number 16 by considering millions of peers
uniformly distributed among the KAD network, and the 16-bit search tolerance
zone will cover more than 20 peers. However, only testing the similarity between
two peers is not enough. In order to publish or retrieve information within the
KAD network, each time, peers must conduct at least three peers in the same zone
and obtain information from their routing tables [36]. Therefore, in our similarity
measurement, besides testing the routing tables' similarity of two peers, we also
measure the routing tables' similarity among more than two peers.
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Figure 3.4.2: (a) average value of Fa measured in diﬀerent aspects of the KAD
name space; (b) Histogram of the peers availability Fa of the routing table; (c)
CDF of the peers availability Fa of the routing table
Following Kang's work, we measured the routing tables' similarity of peers
belonging to a 16-bit search tolerance zone. Within this zone, the KIDs of all
peers have at least 16-bit preﬁx-matching. In order to obtain more accurate results,
we measured diﬀerent parts of the KAD network by our distributed framework.
Using our measurement component KADmon, we collected a large number of peers
after 48-hour monitoring. These peers were retrieved by another measurement
component RoutingTCrawl, and then their routing tables were crawled. From the
crawled routing tables, the peers belonging to the same 16-bit search tolerance
zone were selected, and their routing tables were crawled again for calculating
the similarity Fs according to Equation 3.4.2. In order to obtain more peers for
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Table 3.3: Measurement data for routing tables' similarity
# of compared
routing tables
# of tested
tolerance
zones
# of tested
peers
average value
of Fs
Standard
Deviation of
Fs
2 4120 8240 0.171 0.050
3 1018 3054 0.093 0.043
4 329 1316 0.069 0.029
5 102 510 0.060 0.022
Summary 5569 13120
comparison, we also continuously retrieved new appropriate peers from the routing
tables of these crawled peers and crawled their routing tables again. During the
test, the routing tables of a total number of more than 13,000 peers belonging to
more than ﬁve thousand diﬀerent search tolerance zones have been crawled and
compared.
The measurement results are shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.4.3, where the
average value of the similarity Fs, the standard deviation of Fs, and the CDF of
Fs among 2, 3, 4 and 5 peers within a speciﬁc tolerance zone are presented. Our
measurement reveals that the similarity Fs within two individual peers is only
less than 20%, which is in contrast to Kang's work. Furthermore, the similarity
signiﬁcantly reduces to less than 10% when comparing to more than two individual
peers within a same tolerance zone. Therefore, the routing tables of the peers
within a 16-bit tolerance zone have little similarity, and actually a large amount
of diversity. The reason for this low similarity can be explained as follows. Under
an open KAD environment, individual peers have their own individual behaviors:
they may arrive and leave the system at diﬀerent times, or they may meet diﬀerent
peers when sharing or requesting diﬀerent content. Consequently, their perspective
to the KAD network becomes diﬀerentiated. Moreover, the design of the KAD
network may also deliberately aggravate the highly diversiﬁed viewpoint among
each peer. According to the KAD rule of maintaining the routing table, when
a peer attempts to ﬁll out its routing table, it is designed to randomly search
for more new peers instead of explicitly synchronizing the routing tables among
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its close peers. There is a large diﬀerence between our measurement results and
Kang's work. Since Kang et al. [42] did not present their measurement in detail,
the accuracy of their test cannot be evaluated.
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Figure 3.4.3: CDFs of similarity for diﬀerent number of compared nodes
On the other hand, we believe the low similarity of routing tables does not
degrade, but improves the lookup performance in the KAD network. The low
similarity can keep publishing peers having a much broader perspective to the
whole KAD network. As a result, more peers who belong to the same search
tolerance zone can be found and chosen for the publication. This also causes
peers to retrieve the published information more easily, even though some of the
published peers leave the system, when peers look up all of them. In contrast, if
the routing tables of the peers within a search tolerance zone have a high similarity,
the information will be published onto a small portion of published peers. When
this small portion leaves the system or when the left portion of peers are tried to
be located, little useful information can be obtained from the KAD network. In
summary, high similarity is not the critical issue for the poor lookup performance,
since it is not detected.
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Table 3.4: Structure of SLI publishing table
Name Description
Content_ID 128-bit content identity
Source_ID 128-bit uploader identity (KID)
Source_IP IP address of the source
Source_TCP TCP port of the source, it is used for content exchange
Source_UDP UDP port of the source, it is used for control communication
3.4.3 The Publishing Table Measurement
Poorly maintaining publishing tables will also tremendously aﬀect the lookup per-
formance. After peers, through their routing tables, ﬁrst locate the published
peers whose publishing tables are holding the desired content, peers must eventu-
ally look up uploaders from these publishing tables. If entries in the publishing
tables are stale, the retrieved information will be useless.
In the KAD network, two kinds of publishing tables are used to maintain
publishing information: the source-location-information (SLI) publishing tables
and the keyword-information (KI) publishing tables. The main structure of these
tables are shown in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 respectively. The source location
information will be inserted into SLI publishing tables of published peers. The
related keywords for the publishing content will be inserted into the KI publishing
tables. While the KI table conveniently helps users look for desirable content
by meta data, such as ﬁle name, ﬁle type, etc., the SLI publishing table is more
important because it contains the actual location information of content. In the
following, we conduct real world measurements to verify the availability of the SLI
publishing table. Then, we use the obtained results to evaluate the maintenance
of the KI table, for the KI table is also maintained by the same schedule of the
SLI table.
Following the same distributed measurement methodology in Section 3.4.2, we
test the publishing tables of multiple nodes that are uniformly distributed on the
entire KID name space. We still use the application KADmon as the monitor,
but develop a new crawl application called PublishTCrawl to crawl publishing
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Table 3.5: Structure of KI publishing table
Name Description
Content_ID 128-bit content identity
Source_ID 128-bit uploader identity (KID)
Content_Name the full name of the content
Content_Size the byte size of the content
Content_Format the type of the content (.mp3, .iso, ...)
tables. PublishTCrawl employs the same technique used by the RoutingTCrawl
component in Section 3.4.2. It is also deployed on each PlanetLab monitor node.
This time all 16 monitors from the PlanetLab testbed act as published peers. They
accept the relevant publishing information and build their own publishing tables
accordingly. Every half hour, the entire SLI publishing table of each monitor is
recorded into a local log ﬁle. At the same time, PublishTCrawl is triggered. It
reads this local log ﬁle and tests the online status of each entry from the SLI
publishing table by sending the KAD Ping-Pong packets. Similar to the routing
table measurement metric Fa, we also deﬁne a measurement metric Pa to measure
the availability of the SLI publishing table. For a single SLI publishing table, Pa
is equal to the total number of the information of living peers ne divided by the
total number of the information recorded peers nr in the table.
Pa =
ne
nr
. (3.4.3)
The measurement was run on 16 PlanetLab-based monitors for a total of 25
hours. In each half-hour trial, on average, the online status of four thousand peers
retrieved from publishing tables were tested. As a result, 800 measurement trials
were totally conducted, and a total number of more than 3,000,000 peers have
been connected.
The measurement results shown in Figure 3.4.4 explicitly reveal that the SLI
publishing table is not well maintained. We believe this poorly maintained pub-
lishing table causes the poor lookup performance in the KAD network. According
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Figure 3.4.4: (a) average value of Pa measured in diﬀerent aspects of the KAD
space; (b) histogram of the source-location-information publishing table; (c) CDF
of the availability Pa of the source-location-information publishing table
to Figure 3.4.4(b) and (c) shown, on average, only less than 25% of peers recorded
in the publishing table are actually online. Consequently, when users request
source location information from these SLI tables, more than 75% of the entries
from the corresponding replies are useless. Additionally, the minimum value of
measured Pa is even closer to 0.15, while the maximum value of measured Pa is
less than 0.35. Figure 3.4.4(a) also indicates that this trend is consistent within
the entire KAD name space.
Why is the publishing table not well maintained? To answer this question, we
ﬁrst explore the KAD maintenance algorithm for the SLI publishing table. The
KAD protocol requires each publishing peer to be responsible for maintaining their
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published information. According to the identity of the published information,
this information is inserted into publishing tables of the published peers whose
KIDs are close. In addition, when the source location information is inserted
into publishing tables for the ﬁrst time, a living-time period of 5 hours is also
attached to this record. After 5 hours, if the corresponding publishing peers are
still online, they will renew this information for another additional 5 hours. If
the publishing peers are oine, their publishing information will be automatically
removed out of the publishing tables after 30 minutes. Thus, even though the
publishing table is held by published peers, the right of maintenance belongs
to remote publishing peers. This method has no problem when the publishing
peers stay online for a long period. However, if publishing peers leave the system
within 5 hours after its publication, both the published location information and
the published keywords information become useless when the users subsequently
retrieve the information during the rest of the time period. Additionally, the KI
publishing table is also maintained by the same scheme, except that the living-
time period for each publishing entry is extended to 24 hours. Thus, it also suﬀers
from the same weakness as this maintenance scheme.
An incentive policy that is called a credit system is actually employed in
aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing systems [45]. This credit system aims to promote
sharing and accordingly to penalize the selﬁsh. Since a peer in the aMule/eMule
is also the same peer in the KAD network, incenting peers in aMule/eMule also
incents peers in the KAD network. In aMule/eMule, after downloading the whole
content, the downloaders are forced to publish the content information onto the
KAD network immediately (they also become uploaders). If the credit system can
prolong the stay time of uploaders, they can be located through the publishing
table in the future. Otherwise, if peers leave the system within 5 hours of pub-
lication, the entries from publishing tables cannot be reached any more for the
rest of the time. This will be one of main issues that cause the low availability
of publishing tables and consequently one of the critical reasons for the ineﬃcient
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lookup performance.
Can the credit system prolong the stay time of publishing peers for at least 5
hours? To answer this, we conduct another measurement study to examine the
behavior of publishing peers. We still use our distributed measurement framework.
The 16 monitors as published peers are responsible for collecting the information
of publishing peers. Every 30 minutes, the crawler component PublishTCrawl
retrieves each entry from the publishing table of the monitor and tests its online
status. This test has been performed for 24 hours. Our measurement data shown
in Figure 3.4.5 veriﬁes that the majority of the publishing peers (more than 75% of
them) leave the system within one hour after they publish their content. According
to our discovery, even though a credit incentive policy has been employed by both
aMule/eMule P2P ﬁle-sharing system and the KAD network, the majority of
peers will still leave the system quickly after they ﬁnish their downloading tasks.
Therefore, peers in aMule/eMule and the KAD network are selﬁsh, and the current
credit system is less useful.
In conclusion, the reasons for the low availability of the publishing tables and
the poor lookup performance of the KAD network can be summarized as follows:
• the selﬁshness of the publishing peers and the poor incentive policy;
• the publishing tables of published peers are maintained by the publishing
peers;
• the poorly designed 5/24 hours maintaining schedule for both the SLI publish
tables and the KI publishing table.
We noticed that in previous works[36, 34, 42] the main focus is improving the
performance at the side of published peers. However, with the selﬁsh departure of
the publishing peers, the publishing information becomes meaningless. Therefore,
we argue that controlling behaviors of peers should become a necessary consider-
ation for the KAD design. Actually, a more eﬀective incentive policy should be
designed to deal with the high level of selﬁshness.
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Figure 3.4.5: The histogram of the percentage of selﬁsh peers leaving the system
within one hour after publishing content to the KAD network
3.5 Possible Solutions
To solve the low lookup performance issue of the KAD network, we discuss three
possible schemes in this section and show their advantages and weaknesses respec-
tively.
3.5.1 Self-Maintenance Scheme
One possible scheme is to assign the task of maintaining publishing tables back to
the local peers (published peers) themselves. The published peers can verify the
online status of entries in their publishing tables within a short time period (e.g.
10 minutes). They can also directly synchronize the information of peers from
their well-maintained routing tables. With this modiﬁcation, stale records in the
publishing tables can be signiﬁcantly reduced, and retrieved information by other
peers can be more useful. Other advantages of this self-maintenance scheme may
include: it does not change any fundamental structure of the current system; it
uniﬁes the maintenance pattern of the routing table and the publishing tables; it
may also be easily implemented. However, the self-maintenance scheme improves
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the availability of the publishing tables just based on reducing the number of use-
less records. Because of the selﬁsh behavior of peers and poor incentive policy,
this scheme cannot fundamentally improve the lookup performance of the KAD
network. The total amount of useful information available to users was not in-
creased. Additionally, since it needs to renew publishing tables frequently, it may
also introduce far more table-maintaining traﬃc into the system.
3.5.2 Chunk-Based Publishing/Retrieving Scheme
We can use a chunk-based publishing/retrieving scheme to replace the current
ﬁle-based publishing/retrieving scheme. In aMule/eMule, the chunk-based down-
loading and uploading scheme has already been employed to speed up the content
sharing process. Under the chunk-based scheme, a ﬁle is usually separated into
several chunks. Each chunk can be downloaded from diﬀerent peers and uploaded
to others simultaneously. However, instead of publishing the information of an ob-
tained chunk immediately, a peer in aMule/eMule publishes the information of an
entire ﬁle into the KAD network. That is, under the current publishing/retrieving
scheme, the ﬁle will not be published into the KAD network until it has been fully
obtained.
In a typical P2P ﬁle-sharing environment, a peer usually runs both the upload-
ing and the downloading processes concurrently, and this peer will not leave the
system before it completes its download tasks. Thus if the information of peers,
who possesses some chunks of the whole ﬁle, can also be published, the availabil-
ity of the publishing table will be signiﬁcantly improved. The obvious advantage
of this modiﬁcation is that it can increase the amount of useful information for
users retrieving in the future. However, this scheme requires a redesign of the
publishing/retrieving scheme, which may not be easily implemented. Moreover, it
will also complicate the maintenance of the publishing tables and introduce more
traﬃc into the system.
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3.5.3 Strict Fairness Scheme
The third solution is to adapt some eﬀective incentive policy to mitigate the self-
ish behavior of peers. Currently, aMule/eMule has already deployed a local credit
system to reward the sharing behavior. However, this policy is neither eﬃcient
nor fair [45]. The KAD network has not employed any fairness strategy to pro-
mote the publishing and retrieving process exclusively. Since the selﬁsh behavior
of peers will lead to the low lookup performance of the KAD network, some strict
fairness modiﬁcation must be introduced into the KAD network. One possible
strict fairness scheme may base on how to fairly allocate sources location infor-
mation among requestors. After receiving requests for sources location, the KAD
network will return a diﬀerent number of sources according to the credit that the
requester has, while the credit value depends on peers' previous sharing behavior
in the KAD network. The detailed policy is as follows.
• For the requester who stays longer and shares enough content location infor-
mation in the KAD network, i.e., it will be awarded a high value of credit,
the requestor would be provided all known sources information for the KAD
network. Through this rule, publishers may be promoted to stay in the
system longer for obtaining more credit.
• For the requester whose credit value is lower than a threshold or without
credit, the number of returned sources information would be proportional
to the requester's credit. This rule aims to punish publishers who will leave
the system soon after publishing their downloaded content into the KAD
network.
With this scheme, if a publisher leaves the system soon, the publisher's beneﬁt
will be decreased when it tries to retrieve information in the future and vice
versa. In addition, since adopting the fairness-based modiﬁcation will keep the
publishing/retrieving scheme of the KAD network unchanged, it may make the
implementation relatively easy. However, even though the modiﬁcation based on
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Table 3.6: Comparison of diﬀerent modiﬁcation schemes
Methods improve Pa improve the
amount of useful
information
reduce
selﬁsh
behavior
change
current
structure
introduce
more traﬃc
current scheme No No No No No
self-maintenance Yes No No No Yes
chunk-based Yes Yes No Yes Yes
fairness policy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
the fairness design has a great advantage by fundamentally reducing the selﬁsh
behavior of peers and accordingly improve the lookup performance of the KAD
network, the introduction of a strict fairness policy will still increase the complexity
of the KAD network.
We have summarized the comparison of these modiﬁcations in Table 3.6. It
looks like no modiﬁcation is perfect. We believe that a combination of these
possible modiﬁcations will be the most valid scheme to deal with the lookup per-
formance issue of the KAD network.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter focuses on investigating the reasons for the poor lookup performance
of the KAD network. As the key components in the publishing/retrieving process,
the maintenance of both the routing table and the publishing table are tested by
several large-scale measurements. To keep the results accurate, the distributed
measurement framework is deployed onto multiple nodes from the PlanetLab
testbed. First, the availability and the similarity of peers' routing tables are
tested. For the availability of the routing table, test results show that on average
more than 80% of nodes in the routing table are online. For similarity, test results
show that less than 25% of records are the same among diﬀerent routing tables
of peers belonging to a tolerance zone. Therefore, the routing table is shown to
be well maintained, and it can help peers ﬁnd their desired partners easily. After
that, the source-location-information publishing table is tested. Test results show
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that on average only around 25% of items in this table are online. Furthermore,
the average staying time of the publishers is also measured, and the measurement
results reveal that over 75% of publishers leave the system within one hour after
publishing content. As the publishers are required to maintain its published con-
tent information, the maintenance policy regulates that their published content
information will stay online for a relative long period (5 hours by default). Noticed
that the current incentive policy, the credit system, cannot keep publishers staying
at the KAD network for such a long time. The current maintaining method for the
publishing table, the poor incentive policy, and the selﬁshness of the publishing
peer are the reasons for the low availability of the publishing tables, which ac-
cordingly cause the poor lookup performance of the KAD network. Finally, three
possible modiﬁcations are proposed to deal with this lookup performance deﬁcien-
cies: a self-maintenance scheme, a chunk-based publication/retrieval scheme and
a strict fairness scheme. Their advantages and drawbacks are also compared.
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Evaluating Stranger Policies in P2P
File-Sharing Systems with
Reciprocity Mechanisms
Treating strangers carelessly in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system will cause the degrada-
tion of system performance and fairness. In this chapter we evaluate the impact of
diﬀerent stranger policies on system performance and fairness. First, we present
the necessity of designing an eﬀective stranger policy in a typical P2P ﬁle-sharing
system. Then, we review the related research work about P2P's performance and
fairness. After that, in the case of the indirect reciprocity incentive mechanism
being used, we adopt both numerical analyses and agent-based simulations to eval-
uate the impact of a broad range of stranger policies from extremely rewarding
strangers to extremely restricting them. In the case of the direct reciprocity incen-
tive mechanism being used, we conduct an agent-based simulation model and use
it to reveal the impact of stranger policies on system performance and fairness.
Finally, two cases studies on BitTorrent and aMule/eMule provide deep insight
into the design trade-oﬀ of stranger policies.
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4.1 Introduction
A typical P2P ﬁle-sharing system usually holds a large number of users and pos-
sess the features of distribution, self-organization, and self-management. P2P
ﬁle-sharing systems prefer a large population because it can bring high system
throughput, large scalability, and strong robustness. In order to attract as many
peers as possible, P2P ﬁle sharing systems, like BitTorrent [17] and aMule/eMule
[15, 16], tend to provide open environments (i.e. allowing peers to create their
own identities independently and without any cost; permitting peers to attend
and leave the system freely). However, even though this open environment can
promote the population of peers, it may also provide additional beneﬁts to self-
ish peers. The extremely selﬁsh peers only consuming the downloading resource
without any contribution, called free-riders, always easily exist in an open P2P
ﬁle-sharing environment. The system performance of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems
fully relies on each peer's cooperation. Obviously, free-riding behavior contributes
nothing to system performance, in addition, it harms contributors and eventually
degrades system performance.
To maintain system performance, the free-riding issue has to be treated se-
riously, and fairness, which promote generous behavior and alleviate free-riding,
usually has to be maintained in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. Otherwise, free-riding
may become popular. A previous measurement study in [2] indicated that around
70% of peers in Gnutella, a famous P2P ﬁle sharing system which lacks a fairness
mechanism, were free-riders. The characteristics of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems in au-
tonomy, self-organization, and self-management give much more freedom to peers.
A peer in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system is controlled by an individual person who has
the ability to choose, independently, whether to contribute or not. In addition,
peers may locate in diﬀerent regions or belong to diﬀerent service providers. They
may have diﬀerent uploading bandwidths and downloading bandwidths. Thus, a
low contribution level may not represent selﬁsh behavior. As a result, mandatory
management in term of a uniform standard may introduce additional unfairness
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to them. Consequently, a fairness policy based on incentive mechanisms is natu-
rally the appropriate method, in which collaboration is promoted and free-riding
is prevented.
Fairness in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems is usually maintained by reciprocity-based
incentive mechanisms [3, 4], in which the beneﬁt of peers is based on their historical
sharing behavior. These reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms are commonly
divided into two typical classes [4]: indirect reciprocity mechanisms (IRMs), which
are widely discussed in [27, 12, 11, 28], and direct reciprocity mechanisms (DRMs),
which are popularly adopted in P2P ﬁle-sharing networks such as BitTorrent and
aMule/eMule. Under the IRMs, a global reputation level for each peer is normally
calculated and distributed, and consequently, peer A's service to peer B could
depend on B's former service to other peers. Under the DRMs, each peer merely
maintains the information of their former partners, and this results in A's service
to B depending only on B's previous service to A.
4.1.1 The Stranger Policy
To design an eﬀective reciprocity-based incentive mechanism, we believe how to
deal with strangers is indispensable. When contributors choose uploading candi-
dates, they must make decisions on whether or not to provide content to strangers
whose historical behavior information are not known. In a P2P ﬁle-sharing sys-
tem, there may exist diﬀerent deﬁnitions for strangers, which will aﬀect how to
design stranger policies considerably. For instance, if the strangers are recognized
as peers just arriving into the system, the time factor must be included to judge
strangers, such as how long a stranger will be a known peer. If the strangers are
deﬁned as peers without any sharing behavior, a strict policy should be adopted
to penalize strangers. In this chapter, we deﬁne the stranger from the viewpoint of
the uploaders. Considering that each uploader in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system must
individually choose downloading requesters for uploading, a stranger is a candidate
peer, who has been unknown by the uploader, no matter how long this candidate
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peer stays in the system. The word `unknown' here means either the uploader has
not exchanged content with this stranger before, or the uploader cannot obtain
the behavior information of this stranger from other peers. Corresponding with
strangers (unknown peers), another kind of peer called known peers also exist in
the system. For an uploader, known peers are a kind of peer who either exchanged
content with this uploader, or their sharing information with other peers can be
obtained by this uploader. According to an incentive policy, a known free-rider
cannot be serviced by its uploader. Thus, the known peers in the following parts
will refer to the known general peers, who legitimately upload and download by
following P2P rules. In the following sections, the word strangers is used to
represent the unknown peers.
The reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms work according to the historical
behavior of peers. Thus, these mechanisms are helpful for managing known peers.
However, the mechanisms are incapable of tackling the strangers because strangers
do not have any behavior information for their uploaders. In a typical P2P ﬁle-
sharing system with a reciprocity-based incentive mechanism, strangers are the
following peers:
• Under the IRMs, strangers can be new arrival general peers (legitimate new-
comers) or whitewashers. The general newcomers are peers who arrive into
the system for the ﬁrst time. They have not exchanged data to others and are
considered strangers by their current partners. However, the general new-
comers can potentially become known peers after uploading content to their
partners. The whitewashers [9] are free-riders who pretend to be newcomers
for more beneﬁts by leaving and rejoining the system with updated new IDs.
By frequently changing their IDs, whitewashers become strangers to their
partners. We know that to obtain the beneﬁts intended for strangers, free-
riders in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system with the IRM have strong motivations to
whitewash. Otherwise, they could be easily recognized and isolated.
• Under the DRMs, the strangers for a uploader can be divided into three
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categories: general newcomers, free-riders who have not downloaded content
from this uploader (otherwise, they will be recognized as free-riders by this
uploader), and general peers who have not exchanged content with the up-
loader (but they have exchanged content with other peers). We know that
free-riders do not need to whitewash to beneﬁt under the DRMs. This is
because the local knowledge of general peers is not spread to others. There-
fore, free-riders do not have to worry about their selﬁsh behavior toward one
peer being known and accordingly being punished by other peers.
To help readers ﬁgure out the scopes of free-riders, strangers, and whitewashers,
we illustrate them in Figure 4.1.1
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Figure 4.1.1: The relationship among free-riders, strangers, and whitwashers.
Since every uploader (the resourceable general peer) faces the issue of how
to deal with such strangers eﬃciently in an open P2P environment, treatment
policies need to be established. Even though the impacts of stranger policies to
general newcomers and free-riders are respectively intuitive, the impacts of diﬀer-
ent stranger policies to system performance and fairness cannot be decided easily,
because we cannot distinguish free-riders from general newcomers in a typical P2P
environment [9]. For system fairness, restricting strangers policy is not necessarily
better than rewarding strangers policy. The reason is that the policy of restricting
strangers treats free-riders fairly, but treats general newcomers unfairly; while the
policy of rewarding strangers treats general newcomers fairly, but treats free-riders
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unfairly. Similarly, for performance, rewarding strangers is also not necessarily
better than restricting them. As we know, promoting the potential contribution
of general newcomers will also promote selﬁsh consumption of free-riders. Thus,
rewarding strangers can provide more uploading bandwidth to systems, but may
also provide more bandwidth to selﬁsh competitors at the same time. On the
other hand, limiting the consumption of free-riders will unavoidably limit the con-
tribution of general newcomers. As a result, restricting strangers reduces selﬁsh
competitors in systems, but also reduces the total uploading bandwidth. Even
though the treatment policy for strangers aﬀects system performance and fairness
remarkably, few quantitative evaluations for diﬀerent stranger policies currently
exist in literature [3, 46].
4.1.2 Contribution
Maintaining fairness in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems normally focuses on how to fairly
allocate resources (i.e. the upload bandwidth of resourceable general peers) among
peers. Speciﬁcally, each uploader needs to independently make the decision of
how to allocate their uploading bandwidth to others. In this chapter, we focus on
an anonymous, open P2P ﬁle-sharing environment with the IRMs/DRMs, where
each peer can independently assign upload bandwidth to their known peers and
strangers according to an adopted stranger policy. We evaluate the impact of dif-
ferent stranger policies on system performance and fairness through the following
methodology.
1. We deﬁne a performance metric (Equation 4.3.5) and a fairness metric
(Equation 4.3.4). The performance metric is used to measure the average
downloading rate of general peers in the system. The fairness metric is used
to evaluate whether or not peers are treated fairly.
2. We deﬁne stranger policies as the total percentage of the uploading band-
width of each resourceable general peer assigned to strangers. As shown in
65
Chapter 4 Section 4.1
Stranger 
policies
The percentage of uploading
bandwidth to strangers
Extremely 
reward
Extremely 
restrict
Intermediate
aMule/eMule
BitTorrent
Figure 4.1.2: The relationship between the spectrum of diﬀerent stranger policies
and the percentage of the uploading bandwidth to strangers. The x axis represents
diﬀerent stranger policies, and the y axis represents the percentage of the uploading
bandwidth to strangers.
Figure 4.1.2, the leftmost point represents the extremely rewarding stranger
policy that gives most of the uploading bandwidth to strangers. In con-
trast, the rightmost point represents the extremely restricting stranger policy
which assigns an extremely small percentage of the uploading bandwidth to
strangers. The intermediate points represent the stranger policies giving the
gradually decreasing uploading bandwidth to strangers with the direction of
the arrow of x axis.
3. With the IRMs, we use both numerical analyses and agent-based simulations
to evaluate the whole spectrum of these diﬀerent stranger policies shown in
Figure 4.1.2.
4. With the DRMs, we adopt an agent-based simulation to study the impact
of these diﬀerent stranger policies on system performance and fairness.
5. We illustrate the validity of this simulation model by analyzing and testing
the stranger policies in BitTorrent and aMule/eMule.
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Based on this methodology, the following are the key ﬁndings:
1. The extremely restricting stranger policy brings the best fairness at the
cost of the degradation of performance. The extremely rewarding stranger
policy cannot provide the highest performance to the system. Appropriately
choosing the intermediate policy shown in Figure 4.1.2 can bring the highest
performance to the system. The system performance can be improved when
the potential contribution of general newcomers is quickly promoted, while
free-riders could also obtain beneﬁts at that point.
2. The results reveal that under diﬀerent stranger policies, the varying tendency
of performance and fairness are not consistent, and the optimal performance
and fairness (free-riders will not survive) of the system cannot be reached
simultaneously. Speciﬁcally, when the system reaches the best fairness where
a very small fraction of uploading bandwidth is allocated to strangers, free-
riders will be signiﬁcantly restricted and cannot easily obtain beneﬁts from
the system. However, the system performance will be negatively aﬀected
due to the delay of potential contribution of general newcomers. When the
system reaches the highest performance where at least some part of the
uploading bandwidth is allocated to strangers, free-riders also receive this
beneﬁt and survive in the system. Moreover, due to free-riders surviving at
this point, general peers may tend to free-riding since they are rational and
receive less beneﬁt than free-riders, or they may directly leave the system
due to being treated unfairly. Eventually, these consequences will negatively
aﬀect the system performance. Taking this design dilemma into account,
P2P designers are required to tackle strangers carefully according to their
individual design goals.
3. Diﬀerent realistic P2P ﬁle-sharing networks have diﬀerent design objectives.
According to the agent-based simulation, we show that BitTorrent prefers
to maintain fairness by sacriﬁcing its performance, while the fully rewarding
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stranger policy of aMule/eMule promotes the beneﬁt of free-riders. We also
suggest some possible alternative improvements for both BitTorrent and
aMule/eMule.
4.2 Related Work
Researches on P2P ﬁle-sharing systems have grown in the past years. Not only the
performance, but accordingly the fairness and the major management approach
on maintaining performance in P2P systems, have also been widely studied. This
section presents the related work in studying the performance and fairness of P2P
systems.
4.2.1 Research on Performance
To evaluate the performance of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, the research community
adopted diﬀerent approaches, such as mathematical analyses and empirical studies.
4.2.1.1 Numerical Analyses
Typical P2P systems have tremendous population. The behavior of each peer is
random. Thus, compared to other research approaches, mathematical analysis
would be a fast and eﬀective method that can capture the main performance
characteristics of P2P systems. The following paragraphs summarize the relative
contributions from numerical analysis of P2P performance.
Z. Ge et al. [47] was the ﬁrst paper to analytically study the performance of
P2P systems. They modeled P2P systems with multiple class queuing networks,
where peers with diﬀerent behavior belonged to diﬀerent classes (e.g. the class of
general peers and the class of free-riders). In their model, there was a single queue
serving all queries from diﬀerent peers, while each sharing ﬁle was served by its
own service queue. Thus, the rate about servicing the queries was in proportion
to the number of online peers, while the capacity of servicing a sharing ﬁle was
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proportional to both the number of online peers and the popularity of the ﬁle.
With these assumptions, the service capacity of a distinctive ﬁle was described
by the Zipf's distribution [48], and system throughputs under distinctive P2P ar-
chitectures were compared: queries through centralized nodes, queries through
ﬂooding, and queries through DHT. However, their assumption of a newly arriv-
ing peer being available to serve ﬁles to its peers is not true in reality, and this
can negatively aﬀect the accuracy of this model.
M. Lin et al. [49] proposed a stochastic framework to investigate the perfor-
mance of P2P ﬁle-sharing. Based on the density dependent jump Markov process
model [50], they studied the performance of P2P ﬁle-sharing systems where a ﬁle
with K chunks was distributed among a number of peers. In their model, the
system states were described by peers having diﬀerent number of chunks. Using
the theory of Markov process, the authors deduced the formulas for a system's
average downloading time. They also provided the upper bound and lower bound
of the average downloading time and sojourn time of a peer when the peer's down-
loading ﬁle included a total of K chunks. However, the assumption of new arrival
peers always holding one chunk limited the application scope of this model.
In addition to these studies in general P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, the perfor-
mance of BitTorrent and aMule/eMule, the largest P2P ﬁle-sharing systems in
the real world, have also been widely analyzed.
D. Qiu et al. [51] developed a ﬂuid model to study the performance of Bit-
Torrent. In their model, peers were divided into downloaders and seeders. The
change rates of downloaders and seeders were formulated by the diﬀerences be-
tween their arrival rates and departure rates. The system average downloading
time was derived by Little's law [52]. With their analytical results, the authors
believed that BitTorrent was very eﬃcient at distributing ﬁles.
L. Guo et al. [53] adopted the same model in Dongyu's work to study the
evolution of a single-torrent system. They found the service availability became
poor quickly when the arrival rates of peers were reduced exponentially. After that,
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they developed a graph model to analyze the correlation of a multiple-torrent
system, where peers exchanged more than one ﬁle simultaneously. Finally, the
authors suggested that the collaboration among multiple-torrent system could be
used to solve the issue of service availability in a single-torrent system.
Y. Tian et al. [54] presented an analytical model to explore the distribution
of peers who download a distinctive ﬁle in BitTorrent. With the extension of
Dongyu's model, they explored a ﬁle sharing process with the Markov chain, with
which the transfer rates between two adjacent states were a function of both the
number of peers and the eﬀect of TFT incentive policy [17] among them. Their
numerical results showed that the distribution of peers at the diﬀerent levels of
their downloading completeness presented a U-shaped curve. They believed this
was because BitTorrent's TFT policy limited the rate of peers obtaining content
when they had very small or very large portions of the sharing ﬁle.
S. Petrovic et al. [55] also presented a ﬂuid model to study the performance of
eMule. By applying Little's law and the conservation law that the total uploading
capacity equals the total downloading capacity, the model could build the rela-
tionship between the average download time of a ﬁle and the popularity of this
downloading ﬁle. However, this approach has been limited by the assumption of
each peer connecting to all the other peers in the system.
4.2.1.2 Experimental Approaches
Experimental methods have also been widely employed to study the performance
of P2P systems in the real world. These methods usually measure the real P2P
systems for a relatively long period with either passive monitors or active crawls.
M. Izal et al. [56] analyzed a 5-month track log, which was recorded while a
tracker monitored the content exchange process of peers. They observed that P2P
ﬁle systems like BitTorrent had good scalability and high average downloading
rates. Using a modiﬁed BitTorrent client to achieve a series of content exchanging
processes, they also showed that a correlation existed between the downloading
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rate and uploading rate.
J. A. Pouwelse et al. [57] collected the information of peers from a BitTorrent
tracker and measured the downloading progress of these peers. Their measure-
ments revealed that the average downloading rate of peers was high, the availabil-
ity of sharing content depended on their popularity, and the availability of peers
was low because of the deﬁciency of the incentive policy to seeders.
J. Yang et al. [58] adopted an active probing method to measure aMule/eMule.
They developed several applications to crawl hundreds of index servers and millions
of eMule/aMule clients separately. With these measurements, they presented the
geographic distribution of these clients and the capacity of each index server.
L. Plissonneau et al. [59] focused on a large number of residential aMule/eMule
users with ADSL connection. By monitoring the TCP connection of these cus-
tomers, they distinguished the aMule/eMule's ﬂows from others via their special-
ized transfer ports. With the measurements, they revealed that the popularity of
sharing ﬁles were not Zipf distributed, while the waiting time before downloading
was correlative with the popularity of the downloading ﬁle, and the downloading
rate was not as fast as the connection capacity.
4.2.2 Research on Fairness
Due to their self-organizing and self-managing features, the system performance
of P2P ﬁle-sharing networks fully relies on each peer's cooperation on a fair foun-
dation. As a result, a number of studies have also focused on the fairness issue in
P2P ﬁle-sharing networks.
4.2.2.1 General Studies on Reciprocity-Based Incentive Policies
To maintain fairness in a distributed P2P system, reciprocity incentive policies
might become a fundamental component. The relative studies are summarized
below.
D. S. Menasche et al. [4] focused on studying the eﬃciency of reciprocity in-
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centive policy in a general P2P ﬁle-sharing system. By deﬁning the reciprocity
mechanism into two types: direct and indirect, they compared the eﬃciency dif-
ference between them. Their analytical results showed the eﬃciency of an indirect
reciprocity mechanism could reach at most twice of the eﬃciency of a direct pol-
icy. However, their classing the incentive policy of aMule/eMule into the indirect
reciprocity type is not believed to be correct.
M. Feldman et al. [5] studied the reciprocity mechanism of P2P ﬁle-sharing
systems with game theory. The authors presented that an indirect reciprocity
mechanism could provide a higher level of cooperation to a system than a direct
reciprocity mechanism. They were also the ﬁrst to discuss the stranger policies for
P2P systems and pointed out that inappropriately dealing with strangers could col-
lapse the system. To deal with the whitewashing issue, the authors also proposed
a stranger adaptive policy, but this policy had only been veriﬁed by simulation.
B. Q. Zhao et al. [14] designed a general framework to analyze the incentive
policy in P2P networks. In this framework, the incentive policy was modeled with
the gain obtained by a peer when this peer contributed service to other peers.
However, the prediction of their model about the mirror incentive policy (like
BitTorrent's TFT policy) leading to system collapse had not been founded in the
real world. Moreover, the impact of stranger policy had not been considered in
this work.
4.2.2.2 Indirect Reciprocity Incentive Mechanism
As a reminder, an indirect incentive mechanism can help a peer choose their
partners according to their individual global reputation levels. The following part
summarizes the relative studies.
R. Sherwood et al. [11] designed a cooperative system for P2P with the indirect
incentive mechanism. In this system, each transaction was assigned a trust value.
When calculating the trust level of a single peer, a peer ﬁrst built a trust graph
including multiple direct or indirect transaction paths from itself to this peer.
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After that, the trust value was computed with the combination of the transaction
values along diﬀerent paths. However, how to deal with newcomers had not been
considered within this work.
S. D. Kamvar et al. [12] presented an algorithm to assign a global trust value
to every peer. The local reputation score of each peer would ﬁrst be computed
by itself independently, and accordingly each peer's global reputation value was
determined by using the local scores from its partners, weighted by the global
reputation of these partners. A distributed algorithm was then developed, which
allocated the computing and storing tasks to each peer. Unfortunately, the new-
comer issue had not yet been discussed in this work.
Z. Y. Liu et al. [13] designed an indirect incentive algorithm based on the
assumption that each peer in the system belonged to a social network. By using
the knowledge of the underlying social network, the authors showed that this
algorithm had a good eﬃciency under diﬀerent service demands.
4.2.2.3 Direct Reciprocity Incentive Mechanism
The direct reciprocity incentive mechanism, due to its simplicity, has also been
adopted by popular P2P ﬁle-sharing systems like BitTorrent and aMule/eMule.
However, because of some design issues, both BitTorrent and aMule/eMule did
not provide suﬃcient incentive to peers and therefore could not eﬃciently limit
free-riding behavior. The related research is summarized below.
T. Locher et al. [60] developed a free-riding BitTorrent client called BitThief
to examine the eﬃciency of the oﬃcial Tit-For-Tat incentive policy. Using some
design issues of BitTorrent, this client could retrieve many more sources from
trackers than the oﬃcial BitTorrent client. As a result, their experiments showed
that a BitThief client could always achieve a high downloading rate, even though
it never contributed any data to others.
M. Sirivianos et al. [18] also modiﬁed a BitTorrent client that knew more
peers than the compared oﬃcial client. Like Locher's work, they also showed
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that this modiﬁed client achieved free-riding easily, and its average downloading
rate was higher than that of the compared oﬃcial client. Using PlanetLab-based
experiments, they indicated that the system performance would be degraded with
the increment of the population of the free-rider.
S. Handurukande et al. [20] modiﬁed an eDonkey client and used it to crawl the
eDonkey network for over 50 days. Besides showing the existence of the clusters,
their work also found a popular free-riding behavior in the system. However, the
reason for the popularity of free-riding in eDonkey network had not been pointed
out in this paper.
4.2.3 Research on the Relation Between Performance and
Fairness
A few researches [8, 9, 61, 62] have investigated the relation between system per-
formance and system fairness as shown below.
R. Krishnan et al.[8] considered the shared content as public goods. During
the content exchanging process, each peer tried to maximize its own utility. Using
game theory, the authors proved that free-riders could still exist under the socially
optimal outcome. Their conclusion is consistent with our work's observation,
where optimal system performance comes from allocating partial bandwidth to
strangers instead of extremely punishing free-riders.
M. Feldman et al. [9] modeled the impact of incentive policies on system
performance on the basis of game theory. The author showed that system perfor-
mance would be improved by punishing free-riding. The authors also considered
that the punishing free-rider policy could not avoid restricting newcomers, but
this only caused the decrease of system performance when the turnover rates were
high. However, the authors had not studied the system fairness explicitly and
quantitatively. Moreover, no veriﬁcation has yet been given in this work.
B. Fan et al. [61] did not focus on a general P2P network, but a speciﬁc P2P
ﬁle-sharing system: BitTorrent. The trade-oﬀ of BitTorrent's performance and
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fairness was further investigated via an uplink-sharing ﬂuid model, where system
performance was assumed to be decided by the total uploading rate. With both the
analytical and simulation results, the authors considered the design of BitTorrent
emphasized fairness more than performance.
4.2.4 Summary of Related Work
Even though a great amount of researches focusing on studying the performance
and the fairness of P2P system already existed, the stranger issue, during their
studies, had either been inappropriately ignored or not been well modeled. In-
spired by the previous works, we investigated the stranger issue in general P2P
ﬁle-sharing systems in the remainder of this chapter.
4.3 Stranger Policies Under the Indirect Reciprocity
Mechanism
Indirect reciprocity mechanisms (IRMs) are recognized as being more scalable, but
more complex than direct reciprocity mechanisms (DRMs). The global reputation
system is the most popular application of IRMs. It has been popularly proposed
to maintain the fairness of P2P systems in [27, 12, 11, 28]. In a P2P ﬁle-sharing
network with a global reputation system, each peer will normally receive a unique
reputation score according to their previous sharing experience. Since this infor-
mation is globally available, each uploader will allocate their uploading bandwidth
to other peers according to their scores. With the global score, general peers can
be easily rewarded, and free-riders can easily be punished. If some peers pursue
beneﬁts by sharing content for a period and then free-riding, their counterfeit be-
havior could be easily distinguished and restricted by assigning diﬀerent weights to
the long-time behavior of peers and their short-time behavior in the calculation of
their reputation score. However, the IRMs are usually vulnerable to whitewashing
[3, 9, 46] because whitewashers cannot be distinguished from general newcomers.
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Therefore, stranger policies under the IRMs may either compromise the penalty
to whitewashers, or delay the cooperation of general newcomers. In this section,
we explore the impact of diﬀerent stranger policies with numerical analyses and
agent-based simulations.
4.3.1 An Analytical Model
To study stranger policies, we conduct mathematical analyses based on the ﬂuid
modeling method. The ﬂuid-based models were popularly adopted in [49, 51, 54,
55, 61] for studying P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. In this work, We modify the classic
ﬂuid model that assumes peers provide the same uploading bandwidth during the
whole content exchange process. Speciﬁcally, we take into account the amount of
available uploading bandwidth that each resourceable general peer (the uploader)
can provide, when these peers experience diﬀerent content exchange periods.
4.3.1.1 Model Description
In a P2P ﬁle-sharing system with the IRM, peers are mainly divided into two
classes: strangers and known peers. The strangers include general newcomers and
whitewashers, and the IRM has no information about these peers. It is worth not-
ing that free-riders must whitewash for survival in a P2P system with the IRM.
Otherwise, free-riders without whitewashing could be easily recognized and iso-
lated. We assume that, to obtain the beneﬁts intended to strangers, free-riders
have strong motivations to whitewash, and consequently they are all whitewash-
ers. The known peers are peers with sharing experiences. Since free-riders without
whitewashing are isolated by the IRM, known peers are considered to be legitimate
peers. In other words, they are resourceable general peers. With this classiﬁca-
tion, diﬀerent stranger treatment policies can be evaluated according to the truth
that each resourceable general peer independently assigns diﬀerent percentages of
uploading bandwidth to the known peers and the strangers respectively.
Our model considers a download task that requests each peer to download
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Figure 4.3.1: The analytical model assume peers need to download total K ﬁles.
At state S1, a peer will download its ﬁrst ﬁle, then this peer moves to state S2
and download the second ﬁle. The process continues until this peer downloads its
last ﬁle at state Sk and leaves the system.
K ﬁles. As shown in Figure 4.3.1, a general peer arrives into the system as a
general newcomer without any ﬁles downloaded yet. In state S1 this general peer
randomly chooses its ﬁrst ﬁle for downloading from other peers. The general peer
then moves to state S2 where it has one downloaded ﬁle. As state S2, the general
peer randomly choose its second ﬁle for downloading, and it also uploads the ﬁrst
ﬁle to other peers simultaneously. Continuing these uploading and downloading
operations, this general peer will eventually reach state SK , where it downloads its
last ﬁle and completes the entire download task. On the other hand, when a free-
rider tries to download the same K ﬁles, it will only process the same downloading
steps without uploading any content at each state Si (1 ≤ i ≤ K). Meanwhile, the
free-rider will change its ID for whitewashing at each state Si when downloading
a new ﬁle. Naturally, this method can also directly model a chunk-based P2P
downloading process for one ﬁle with K chunks, where each chunk is continuously
downloaded when a peer passes through each state Si.
This model follows the assumption in [61]: peers dynamically join and leave the
system. The average arrival rates of general peers and whitewashers are denoted
by λg and λf respectively. Peers will stay in the system until completing the task
of downloading all K ﬁles. As illustrated in Table 4.1, gi(t) and fi(t) represent
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Table 4.1: Parameters for the analytical model
Parameters Meaning
λg average arrival rate of general peers
λf average arrival rate of free-riders (whitewashers)
ε percent of uploading capacity of a resourceable general peer allocated to the
known peers
Si download state i, where i is an integer
K the total number of ﬁles in the download job
gi(t) the number of general peers in state Si (i = 1, 2, ...,K)
fi(t) the number of free-riders (whitewashers) in state Si (i = 1, 2, ...,K)
µ peer's average upload capacity
pm,n the probability that a general peer with m ﬁles can upload content to
another peer with n ﬁles (m,n = 0, 1, 2, ...,K − 1)
Rs a peer's sharing ratio
Rc a peer's comparing ratio
dg general peer's average downloading rate (performance metric)
ug general peer's average uploading rate
df free-rider's (whitewasher's) average downloading rate
Fm fairness metric
the number of general peers and whitewashers at state Si respectively. Without
loss of generality, each ﬁle is assumed to be the same size.
Some previous ﬂuid-based models [51, 61, 55] assumed that the uploading
capacity µ of each resourceable general peer is fully used. However, a general peer
can not provide uploading service to other peers when its content is not useful
to those peers. For example, if the content held by peer A is possessed by all
other peers, the uploading capacity of peer A cannot be used, even though A
prefers to provide service to others. Following the method in [49], we remove
this capacity assumption and introduce a novel parameter pm,n. Before explaining
the deﬁnition of pm,n, we make an assumption that all downloading ﬁles in the
system are uniformly distributed among peers. We believe this assumption can be
guaranteed by the policy used in our model: the downloading order of the total
K ﬁles is random. The parameter pm,n indicates the probability that a general
peer with m ﬁles can upload content to another peer with n ﬁles. Additionally,
as peers in diﬀerent states possess diﬀerent amounts of shareable content, they
have diﬀerent abilities to earn a reputation score. For example, peers in state S1
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only possess one ﬁle, compared with peers in the following states, their ability
of sharing this ﬁle with others and according earn scores is lower. Consequently,
pm,n can also be used to represent diﬀerent reputation scores of peers in diﬀerent
states.
To model diﬀerent stranger policies, we introduce a parameter ε to repre-
sent the percent of uploading bandwidth of a resourceable general peer allocated
to known peers. Consequently, 1 − ε represents the percentage of the upload-
ing bandwidth allocated to strangers. Consequently, people can model diﬀerent
stranger policies by changing the value of ε. For instance, an extreme restricting
stranger policy can be represented by choosing a large value of ε, while an extreme
rewarding stranger policy can be represented by choosing a small value of ε.
Based on the principle of each peer's downloads coming from the other peers'
uploads and according to the property of continuous Markov chains [50], the vary-
ing tendency of the number of peers in the state S1 and Si (1 < i ≤ K) can be
described by the following diﬀerential equations. The deﬁnitions of the variables
used in these equations are given in Table 4.1.
For whitewashers at state S1 and state Si(i = 2, 3, ..., K), Equations 4.3.1
model the change in the number of whitewashers in each state. The ﬁrst part on
the right in Equation 4.3.1 represents the number of whitewashers ﬂowing into the
state, and the second part represents the number of whitewashers ﬂowing out. It
should be noted that the ﬂow out from state Si equals the ﬂow into state Si+1. To
represent the whitewashers ﬂow out of one state, their received uploading rates
need to be summed. These rates are from the resourceable general peers at all the
states except state S1. These resourceable general peers allocate a fraction 1 − ε
of their uploading rate to strangers. We use µ to represent the average uploading
capacity of the general peers. The uploading rate of the uploader at state Sj up
to the download peers at state Si are modeled by µpj,i. Since each resourceable
general peer possibly uploads content to peers at any state, these rates for one
given state are partitioned by the ratio of the number of whitewashers at this given
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state to the total number of peers at all states.

df1(t)
dt
= λf − f1(t)K∑
j=1
(gj(t) + fj(t))
K∑
j=2
gj(t)(1− ε)µpj−1,0
dfi(t)
dt
=
fi−1(t)
K∑
j=1
(gj(t) + fj(t))
K∑
j=2
gj(t)(1− ε)µpj−1,i−2
− fi(t)
K∑
j=1
(gj(t) + fj(t))
K∑
j=2
gj(t)(1− ε)µpj−1,i−1
(4.3.1)
where
pm,n =

1 if 0 ≤ n < m ≤ K − 1
1− Cn−mn
CmK−1
if 0 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ K − 1 Cyx is the binomial coeﬃcient
.
(4.3.2)
Similarly, we use Equations 4.3.3 to model the change in the number of general
peers at each state S1, and state Si(i = 2, 3, ..., K). The ﬁrst part on the right
in these equations represents the number of general peers ﬂowing into the state,
and the second part represents the number of general peers ﬂowing out. The
ﬂow out from state Si equals the ﬂow into state Si+1. The uploading rates to
general peers at state Si are from the resourceable general peers at all the states
except state S1. These resourceable peers allocate a fraction ε of their uploading
rates to known peers. Meanwhile, general newcomers at states S1 are recognized as
strangers, and then these newcomers obtain downloading rates from the remaining
1 − ε percentage. Likewise, the uploading rate of an uploader at state Sj up to
download peers at Si are modeled by µpj,i. Furthermore, since each resourceable
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general peer can possibly upload content to peers at any state, these rates for one
given state are partitioned by the ratio of the number of general peers at this given
state to the total number of peers at all states.

dg1(t)
dt
= λg − g1(t)K∑
i=1
(gj(t) + fj(t))
K∑
j=2
gj(t)(1− ε)µpj−1,0
dgi(t)
dt
=
gi−1(t)
K∑
j=1
(gj(t) + fj(t))
K∑
j=2
gj(t)ξµpj−1,i−2
− gi(t)
K∑
j=1
(gj(t) + fj(t))
K∑
j=2
gj(t)εµpj−1,i−1
(4.3.3)
where,
ξ =

1− ε if i = 2
ε otherwise
.
4.3.1.2 Performance and Fairness Metrics
To measure system performance and fairness, we deﬁne measurement metrics as
follows (These metrics are also used in the subsequent sections):
• Performance metric dg denotes the average downloading rate of the general
peers. A large value of dg usually represents a high system performance.
• Fairness metric Fm combines two kinds of inﬂuencing factors: the sharing
ratio Rs and the comparing ratio Rc. Rs indicates the diﬀerence of a general
peer's cost from its payoﬀ, and Rs represents the fairness from a single peer's
viewpoint, while Rc reveals the system viewpoint on fairness by comparing
the free-rider's average beneﬁt with the general peer's average beneﬁt. Since
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the upper limit of Rs and Rc is one (ug ≥ dg due to the whitewashers'
existence), the closer Fm is to one, the more fair the system is.
Fm = α1Rs + α2Rc = α1
dg
ug
+ α2
dg
dg + df
, (4.3.4)
where α1 and α2 are the weights of these ratios, and α1+α2 = 1, 0 ≤ α1 ≤ 1,
0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1. According to diﬀerent design policies, P2P designers may as-
sign diﬀerent weights to Rc and Rs. For example, they may regard the
sharing ratio Rs as more practicable than the comparing ratio Rc, because
peers themselves can directly measure their own downloading and upload-
ing rate, and accordingly calculating Rs in the system can much easier be
implemented than calculating Rc. Alternatively, some designers may ar-
gue that punishing free-riding behavior should be given higher priority than
other design objectives, since the accumulation of free-riders will cause seri-
ous damage to the whole system. We believe an area of future studies could
focus on the methodology of accurately assigning diﬀerent weights via using
social-science techniques.
Once the system reaches a steady state, the transfer rate into state Si equals the
transfer rate out of state Si, and the left hand of Equation 4.3.3 and of Equation
4.3.1 will become zero. By incorporating this feature with another important
property of P2P ﬁle sharing systems, i.e., total uploading rates of the system are
always equivalent to its total downloading rates, we can calculate the parameters
dg, df and ug respectively.
As shown in Equation 4.3.5, the general peer's average downloading rate, dg,
equals the sum of the uploading rates, which are coming from all resourceable
general peers at states S2 to SK and allocated to general newcomers and the
uploading rates allocated to known general peers, normalized by the total number
of general peers.
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dg =
1
K∑
j=1
gj
(
g1
K∑
j=
(gj + fj)
K∑
j=2
gj(1− ε)µpj−1,0 +
K∑
i=2
gi
K∑
j=1
(gj + fj)
K∑
j=2
gjεµpj−1,i−1).
(4.3.5)
As shown in Equation 4.3.6, the whitewasher's average downloading rate df
equals the total uploading rates, which are coming from all resourceable general
peers at states S2 to SK , allocated to whitewashers, divided by the total number
of whitewashers.
df =
1
K∑
j=1
fj
K∑
i=1
f i
K∑
j=
(gj + fj)
K∑
j=2
gj(1− ε)µpj−1,i−1. (4.3.6)
As shown in Equation 4.3.7, the general peer's average uploading rate ug equals
the sum of the uploading rates allocated to general newcomers, the uploading rates
allocated to known peers, and the uploading rate allocated to whitewashers, which
are coming from all resourceable general peers at states S2 to SK , normalized by
the total number of resourceable general peers.
ug =
1
K∑
j=2
gj
(
g1
k∑
j=
(gj + fj)
K∑
j=2
gj(1− ε)µpj−1,0 +
K∑
i=2
gi
k∑
j=1
(gj + fj)
K∑
j=2
gjεµpj−1,i−1
+
K∑
i=1
f i
K∑
j=
(gj + fj)
K∑
j=2
gj(1− ε)µpj−1,i−1) . (4.3.7)
It should be noted that the property of the total uploading rates of the system
being equivalent to the system total downloading rate doesn't mean that the
average downloading and uploading rates can keep the same equation of ug =
dg + df , because dg, df and ug are all average values, and diﬀerent kinds of peers
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have a diﬀerent population size.
4.3.2 Numerical Analysis and Veriﬁcation
In this subsection, we use the mathematical model to numerically analyze the
impact of diﬀerent stranger policies on system performance and fairness. After
that, we develop an agent-based simulation to verify the numerical results. The
diﬀerent stranger policies will be modeled by diﬀerent values of the parameter ε.
4.3.2.1 Numerical Analysis
Using Equations 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.3.6, and 4.3.7, we numerically analyze the system
performance and fairness of P2P ﬁle-sharing under diﬀerent stranger policies. The
related parameters in these equations are assigned as follows. We assign the pa-
rameter K the number 20, which means we focus on a ﬁle downloading process
where each peer is required to download a total number of 20 ﬁles. Consequently,
the total number of states in the model also equal 20. Without loss of generality,
the size of each ﬁle is the same, and the average upload capacity µ of general
peers is equal to one. During the time period of downloading one ﬁle, the arrivals
of both general peers and free-riders follow Poisson processes with arrival rates
λg = 5/timeslot and λf = 2/timeslot. The values of ε are varied from 0.1, 0.2,
0.3, ... to 0.9. ε = 0 represents strangers getting all of the uploading bandwidth,
and therefore, resourceable general peers are blocked. ε = 1 represents strangers
getting none of the uploading bandwidth and accordingly general newcomers are
blocked. Both ε = 0 and ε = 1 are impractical values for a P2P ﬁle-sharing sys-
tem with an open environment, and consequently they are ignored in the following
analysis. ε = 0.1 and ε = 0.9 represent the extremely rewarding stranger policy
and extremely restricting stranger policy as shown in Figure 4.1.2 respectively,
and the other values of ε represent the intermediate points in Figure 4.1.2, where
strangers are assigned some uploading bandwidth. To calculate the fairness metric
Fm, both α1 and α2 are assigned to 0.5, which means we give the same emphasis
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Figure 4.3.2: Analytical results for diﬀerent stranger policies: (a) shows the per-
formance dg and (b) shows fairness Fm as a function of ε (the percent of uploading
bandwidth to known peers) when λg = 5 and λf = 2.
on fairness from both systems viewpoint and users' viewpoint.
Running our analytical model, we show changes of system performance in
Figure 4.3.2(a). We discover that neither the extremely rewarding stranger policy
nor the extremely restricting stranger policy can provide the highest performance.
Instead, the largest value of the average downloading rate of general peers is
obtained at one intermediate point of the value of ε being close to 0.6, and at that
point 40% of uploading bandwidth is assigned to strangers. In addition, with less
and less uploading bandwidth going to strangers (the increment of the value of ε),
the average downloading rates of whitewashers keep falling. The results in Figure
4.3.2(a) also indicate that the contribution of general peers (their average upload
rate ug) is always greater than their beneﬁts (their average download rate dg).
This makes sense because of the existence of both newcomers and whitewashers,
who consume services without making any contribution.
The analytical results about fairness are shown in Figure 4.3.2(b). We ﬁnd
that the extremely restricting stranger policy helps the system achieve its best
fairness, while the extremely rewarding stranger policy gives the worst fairness to
the system. Obviously, restricting strangers also reduces the beneﬁt of whitewash-
ers, and promoting strangers improves the beneﬁt to whitewashers at the same
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Figure 4.3.3: The number of general peers and whitewashers at diﬀerent down-
loading states Si (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}) under the diﬀerent stranger policies (ε =
0.1, 0.3, 0.6, and 0.9 respectively) in the steady state.
time. Furthermore, the positive slope of the fairness metric Fm indicates that
the system could distinctly limit whitewasher's beneﬁt when the enforcement of
restricting strangers increases. Regarding the changing trends of Rs and Rc shown
in Figure 4.3.2(b), the increasing trend of Rc can be attributed to the continually
decreased uploading bandwidth assigned to whitewashers with the growth of ε,
while the decreasing trend of Rs can be associated with more and more general
newcomers being delayed at the ﬁrst state S1.
Next, we clarify the impact of diﬀerent stranger policies on the population
of peers in the system. We verify the value of ε and plot the number of peers
remaining at each state Si in Figure 4.3.3 when the system reaches a stable state.
If the number of peers remaining in the system is small, we can say that the peers
leaving the system should have already obtained enough downloading bandwidth
to complete their tasks and accordingly have left the system. If the number of peers
remaining in the system is larger, peers may not able to get enough downloading
bandwidth. In other words, the average downloading rate of peers varies inversely
with the number of peers remaining in the system. Like Figure 4.3.3(a) shown,
the total number of general peers remaining in the system when ε = 0.6 is smaller
than those when we assign ε other values. Correspondingly, Figure 4.3.2(a) shows
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that general peers obtain the largest downloading rate at this point. Similarly,
the total number of whitewashers shown in Figure 4.3.3(b) monotonically increases
with the increasing of ε, which is also consistent with the df 's variation shown in
Figure 4.3.2(a). Therefore, by showing the population of peers remaining in the
system, we can provide convincing evidence to explain the results shown in Figure
4.3.2(a). In addition, when ε = 0.1, the number of remaining general peers is
much larger than the number of remaining whitewashers. Under this extremely
rewarding stranger policy, newcomers including whitewashers always receive far
more bandwidth than known peers. When ε = 0.9, the remaining numbers of
both general peers and whitewashers are very high. This is because the potential
contributors are restricted at state S1, and consequently they cannot contribute
to others soon.
P2P designers usually have to decide which stranger policy may be suitable for
their design goals: focusing on performance or paying more attention on fairness.
We develop the following simple formula to help P2P designers calculate the design
trade-oﬀs DT .
DT = αdg + (1− α)Fm (4.3.8)
To ﬁnd an appropriate stranger policy, P2P designers can assign a weight α
to system performance and accordingly assign 1 − α to fairness respectively. For
example, if designers pay most of their attention to system performance (α =
1), according to Equation 4.3.8, they may assign an intermediate value to ε for
their stranger policy as shown in Figure 4.3.4(a). By contrast, according to our
analysis, restricting stranger policy at ε = 0.9 may be used when designers prefer
fairness (α = 0) as shown in Figure 4.3.4(b). Of course, as shown in Figure
4.3.4(c), designers can choose stranger policy ε = 0.6 for best trade-oﬀ, if they
treat performance and fairness equally (α = 0.5).
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Figure 4.3.4: The trade-oﬀ of performance and fairness when designers choose
diﬀerent weight α.
4.3.2.2 Agent-Based Simulation
Using a typical agent-based simulation tool, NetLogo [63], we also develop an
agent-based simulation to verify the analytical results. Agent-based simulation,
as a class of computational modeling, has already been widely used in the research
of ecology, economic, demography, etc. [64]. The agent-based simulation recently
attracted the attention of P2P researchers [65, 66] for its capacity to simulate the
behavior of autonomous agents and their interactions in a complex network.
Simulation Steps
In this simulation, we deﬁne two classes of agents coexisting in an open environ-
ment, general peers and whitewashers. The general peers can obtain reputation
scores according to their contribution. The whitewashers will change their IDs
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after downloading a ﬁle, so they have no reputation scores and are recognized as
strangers. Each resourceable general peer maintains two uploading queues: one
uploading queue holds the known peers, and the other holds strangers. Following
the stranger policy, the resourceable general peer allocates its uploading band-
width into two parts at any time; one part is allocated to a known peer chosen
from the queue for known peers, and the other part is allocated to a stranger
chosen from the queue for strangers.
To capture the functionality of the global reputation system, previous re-
searchers have designed the IRM with either a decentralized or a centralized in-
frastructure [12, 11, 67, 68]. From the viewpoint of making the reputation score
of each peer globally available to other peers, both centralized methods and dis-
tributed methods could provide the same ability. Peers in an IRM system have
consistent opinions about who are known peers and who are strangers. However,
both of these infrastructures also have their own issues in reality. For example,
the centralized infrastructure may suﬀer from the scalability problem when there
are millions of peers online, while the decentralized infrastructure faces the issue
of how to synchronize the information eﬀectively and quickly. Since our work does
not focus on evaluating the structure of global reputation systems, we introduce
a typical hybrid P2P infrastructure to simplify our simulation architecture. That
is, a central index server is introduced into our simulation. It is globally available
to every peer and responsible for maintaining the information of peers, such as
the shareable content information and the reputation information of each peer.
We deﬁne the information publishing and retrieving processes as follows. After
a general peer downloads content from another peer, this general peer will regard
this contributor as its known peer and send its identiﬁcation information to the
central index server. At the same time, as a resourceable general peer (the po-
tential uploader), this general peer will also publish its content information into
this server. Both of these pieces of information have been recorded in the server's
database. Similarly, a downloader will request the uploaders' information about
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desired content from the index server. The server replies to the requests from
downloaders with a list of content providers who are randomly selected from the
server's database. After receiving the reply from the index server, downloaders
can send content-downloading requests directly to these content providers. To
deal with the downloading requests from diﬀerent peers, each uploader will try
to obtain reputation information about each downloader from the index server.
If the reputation information of the requesting peer has been obtained from the
index server, the uploader will insert this requesting peer into its uploading queue
for know peers. Otherwise, it will add the requesting peer into its uploading queue
for strangers, if the downloader is unknown. Additionally, in this simulation we
assume the published information of each peer is trustworthy and ignore the pos-
sible attacks to the global reputation system such as peers lying about knowing
other peers, Sybil attacks, or coalition attacks. There are many proposals about
how to maintain the belief of each peer and how to deal with these attacks, but
those are beyond this work's scope.
Table 4.2: Agent-based simulation parameters
Name Value
ﬁles need to be downloaded 20
each ﬁle size 1000KB
general peers average arrival rate 5/time slot
free-riders average arrival rate 2/time slot
simulation time slot 100 sec.
peers maximum uploading capacity 20KB/sec.
initial peers in the system 100
1-ε: percentage of the uploading bandwidth
of a resourceable general peer to the strangers
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9
We explore diﬀerent stranger policies by running simulations with diﬀerent
values of ε (ε = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9 respectively). Each uploader will choose two peers
from its two queues respectively and upload to them according to the assigned
stranger policy. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 4.2. The whole
simulation time is divided into discrete time slots, and each time slot represents
100 seconds. In the simulation, new joined peers are required to download a total
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of 20 ﬁles with the same size of 1000KB. Initially, there are 100 peers in the
system. Each of them holds an arbitrary number of the downloading ﬁles, but
the maximum number of held ﬁles is less than 20. By following a Poisson process,
general peers and whitewashers arrive at the system with average arrival rates
of 5/time slot and 2/time slot respectively. We ignore the possible downloading
failure due to computer issues or transfer lines problems, and we, by following the
previous work [61], also believe the probability of peers' voluntary departure when
they are downloading their desired content is small. As a result, we assume each
peer will stay in the system until they complete the entire downloading task.
At the beginning of a time slot, each resourceable general peer will randomly
choose a known peer and a stranger from their uploading queues respectively.
Then, the resourceable general peer separates its whole uploading bandwidth
according to the stranger policy and uploads to both the known peer and the
stranger. For the current mainstream access links, such as the ADSL and cable
modem, the downloading bandwidth is no less than the uploading bandwidth.
Thus, we assume the downloading rate is not the limiting factor for the simula-
tion. Instead, we assume each peer has a 20KB/second uploading capacity for
simplicity, and this is the maximum uploading rate that an uploader can provide.
However, as we mentioned in the previous section, the uploading capacity may
not be fully used, and the uploading rate of each resourceable general peer will
be dynamically changed by the amount of their holding content. As a result, a
downloader may have a very high downloading capacity, but this capacity may
not be fully used during its downloading process. We believe this assumption is
closer to the situation in the real world. For instance, considering the following
situation: if downloader B has all the content that uploader A owns, A is not
able to provide uploading service to its partner B. Therefore, A's uploading rate
greatly depends on the total shareable content it possesses, and the uploading rate
of a general peer will increase with the amount of its holding content. However,
we also decide that the uploading rate is still limited by the deﬁned uploading
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capacity of 20KB/second.
We ran this simulation on a standard desktop PC with Intel i7 core and 8GB
memory. Each round of the simulation was about a total of 15000 cycles, which
approximately equaled 17 days (one cycle represents 100 seconds). Since we logi-
cally simulated the uploading and downloading process within each time interval
(there is no real downloading/uploading during the simulation), the actually run-
ning time for simulating each stranger policy was between 1 to 2 days. During
each simulation, more than 100,000 peers attended the system for data exchange,
and approximately 4000GB of data were simulated for downloading and upload-
ing. During the simulation, we recorded each general peer's uploading rate and
downloading rate and each whitewasher's downloading rate. At the end of the
simulation, we calculated the average value of these uploading and downloading
rates respectively.
Simulation Results
Both analytical results and simulation results about dg, Fm, df , and ug are
compared in Figure 4.3.5(a), (b), (c) and (d) respectively. As shown in these
ﬁgures, the simulation results are consistent with the analytical results in the
previous section. Therefore, this veriﬁcation conﬁrms that our analytical model
can capture the characteristics of stranger policies and can be used for the design
of future P2P stranger policies. Most importantly, we have the following ﬁndings
of both the numerical analysis and the simulations:
• The highest system performance comes from a trade-oﬀ of allocating up-
loading bandwidth to both known peers and strangers, but not from an
extremely promoting stranger policy.
• The best fairness is reached when applying an extremely restricting stranger
policy, while system performance is poor at this point.
• The variations of performance and fairness are diﬀerent.
There are some negligible diﬀerences between the analytical and simulation results.
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Figure 4.3.5: Results of a comparison of analytical modeling and agent-based
simulation under diﬀerent stranger policies when λg = 5 and λf = 2.
We attribute these diﬀerences mainly to the downloading pattern of peers used
in the simulation. In fact, in the simulation, we assume that if a peer completes
downloading a ﬁle before the end of a time slot, the peer will be idle until the next
time slot begins.
4.3.3 Stranger Policies Under Diﬀerent Whitewashers Pop-
ulation Size
In this section, we attempt to provide more insights on the trade-oﬀ between
performance and fairness by using the mathematical model in Equations 4.3.4
4.3.5, 4.3.6 and 4.3.7. Our previous analysis revealed the eﬀect of stranger policies
on system performance and fairness, when general peers were the majority of the
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Figure 4.3.6: Analytical results for diﬀerent stranger policies: (a) and (b) shows
the performance dg and fairness Fm as a function of ε , (c) and (d) show white-
washers average downloading rate and general peers average uploading rate re-
spectively.
whole system (λg  λf ). Naturally, we also want to know what will happen
for system performance and fairness when whitewashers begin to dominate the
system, because this scenario is crucial and has been discovered in current P2P
ﬁle-sharing systems [2]. To answer this question, we run the mathematical model
under the following two scenarios where the general peer's arrival rate is still
λg = 5/timeslot, but the whitewasher's arrival rates become λf = 5/timeslot and
λf = 10/timeslot respectively.
The analytical results are shown in Figure 4.3.6. The curve of both performance
and fairness as functions of ε keeps the same shape of the previous analytical re-
sults, when the arrival rate of whitewashers was low. However, by comparing
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the exact values of dg and Fm under the same stranger policy, we ﬁnd overall
system performance and fairness decreases with the increase of whitewashers as
shown in Figure 4.3.6. We attribute this to the growing trend of whitewashers
and to the fact that whitewashers cannot be distinguished from general newcom-
ers under IRMs. Furthermore, we ﬁnd the value of ε for reaching the highest
performance become smaller with the increment of λf , and consequently at these
optimal points the strangers will receive more uploading bandwidth. When the
arrival rates of whitewashers increase, keeping the same value of ε will cause less
bandwidth assigned to general newcomers, who are competing with more and more
whitewhashers. Accordingly, this will reduce the average download rate of general
peers. On the contrary, decreasing the value of ε will allocate more bandwidth
to strangers. Consequently, this will support general newcomers obtain upload-
ing bandwidth relatively quickly, and it will bring more new contributors to the
system early. Unfortunately, as Figure 4.3.6(c) shown, rewarding strangers also
beneﬁts whitewashers, who may gain identical or even higher average download
rates than general peers at those optimal performance points.
4.3.4 Summary
Both our analytical and simulation results reveal that, with stranger policies under
the IRMs, the highest system performance and the best fairness cannot be reached
at the same time. The highest performance can be obtained via a trade-oﬀ be-
tween rewarding strangers and restricting them, and the trade-oﬀ level depends
on the population size of free-riders. In other words, free-riders will survive when
the highest performance is reached, which is consistent with the previous discov-
ery in [8], where the authors mathematically proved that free-riders can still exist
under the socially optimal outcome. On the other hand, the extremely restricting
stranger policy could bring the best system fairness, but it also produces the low-
est performance when the load of free-riding is high. In contrast, the extremely
rewarding stranger policy cannot provide the highest performance to the system,
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and it leads to the lowest performance when the load of free-riding is low, addition-
ally, it also degrades the system to the worst fairness. Therefore, we suggest P2P
designers, when designing the indirect reciprocity incentive mechanisms, carefully
choose their stranger policies according to their individual goals.
4.4 Stranger Policies Under the Direct Reciprocity
Mechanism
In this section, we study the stranger policies under the DRMs. The direct reci-
procity incentive mechanisms are used in current popular P2P ﬁle-sharing systems
such as BitTorrent and aMule/eMule. In these P2P ﬁle-sharing systems, each peer
independently exchanges resources with other peers on the basis of its own individ-
ual experience. Compared with the IRMs, the DRMs simplify system implemen-
tation and reduce network traﬃc. However, a resourceable general peer under the
DRM may be recognized as a stranger by another resourceable general peer if these
two peers have not exchanged content before. This is because resourceable general
peers will diﬀerentiate their partners only in accordance with their local historical
knowledge. On the other hand, unlike a P2P system with the IRM, a free-rider in
a P2P network with the DRM can easily obtain the beneﬁts intended for strangers
without whitewashing. The reason is that the local knowledge of general peers is
not spread to others, and the current P2P ﬁle-sharing systems have no mechanism
to help peers ﬁnd their previous partners. As a result, free-riders do not need to
worry about their selﬁsh behavior toward one peer being known and consequently
being punished by other peers. Thus, whitewashing also becomes unnecessary in
a P2P ﬁle-sharing system with a DRM. This easy free-riding behavior has been
conﬁrmed by the experimental studies in [2, 18, 21].
Instead of mathematically modeling stranger policies in P2P ﬁle-sharing sys-
tems with the DRMs, we explore them directly through an agent-based simulation
model for accuracy. Otherwise, the probabilities of resourceable general peers be-
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ing recognized as strangers need to be adopted, but this probability is believed to
be very dynamic and will be changed according to many diﬀerent factors. Follow-
ing those simulation results, we also conduct two case studies about the stranger
policies in both BitTorrent and aMule/eMule.
4.4.1 An Agent-Based Simulation Model
As deﬁned in the previous section, each resourceable general peer in this agent-
based simulation model classiﬁes its partners into two parts - known peers and
strangers. We believe this classiﬁcation simpliﬁes the evaluation of stranger poli-
cies. The known peers for a resourceable general peer are its previous partners
uploading content to it. But the resourceable general peer keeps the information
of its known peers locally instead of spreading them globally through a central
server. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the resourceable general peer,
its stranger may be categorized into 3 types:
• a general newcomer,
• a resourceable general peer without exchanging content before,
• or a free-rider.
Accordingly, each resourceable general peer independently decides the percentage
of its uploading bandwidth to strangers based on the assigned stranger policy.
During the simulation, the central index server is retained. However, unlike our
previous agent-based simulation on stranger policies under the IRMs, this index
server is only in charge of the task related to publishing and retrieving content
information. There are other content searching methods like decentralized-based
query-ﬂooding and DHT, but searching content centralized or distributed does
not aﬀect the usage of stranger policy. Moreover, searching content from central
nodes is still the main method in BitTorrent, and the current design of DHT
prevents them from eﬀectively being used [69]. Thus, we ignore the other content
searching methods in the simulation implementation and only adopt the central
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index server for searching content. In this simulation model, the central server is
not responsible for collecting the information of known peers. Instead, each peer
individually maintains its known peers through its local database. Speciﬁcally,
when a general peer A downloads a ﬁle from another peer B, it will assign a
reputation score to B (this score will be increased when A downloads more content
from B) and record B as a known peer in its local database. If B requests content
from A later, A's uploading bandwidth to known peers will be allocated back to
B according to its own data records rather than consulting with the central index
server. In addition, a free-rider in this model is not a whitewasher any more, so
the free-rider will never change its ID during the whole downloading task.
The remaining settings in the simulation model are the same as in our previous
agent-based simulation under IRMs. Each resourceable general peer maintains two
uploading queues: one for known peers and the other for strangers. In each time
slot, this resourceable general peer assigns ε percentage of its uploading bandwidth
to the peer with the highest reputation score chosen from its uploading queue for
known peers, while it assigns the remaining uploading bandwidth to a peer which
is randomly selected from its uploading queue for strangers. The downloading rate
of each peer is not the limiting factor. The uploading rate of each resourceable
general peer varies with the total amount of its holding content, but the uploading
rate is limited by the uploading capacity 20KB/second. The simulation parameters
are shown in Table 4.2.
We also ran the simulations for diﬀerent stranger policies (ε = 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9
respectively). The general peer's arrival rate was still λg = 5/100sec, but the
whitewasher's arrival rates changed based on the following values: λf = 2/100sec,
λf = 5/100sec and λf = 10/100sec respectively. Each simulation ran for a total
of 15000 cycles, which approximately equaled 17 days (one cycle represents 100
seconds). For each simulation, more than 100,000 peers had participated in the
system for content exchange, and approximately 4000 GB of content had been
simulated for downloading and uploading. During the simulation, we recorded
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each general peer's uploading rate and downloading rate and each free-rider's
downloading rate. At the end of the simulation, we calculated the average value
of these uploading and downloading rates respectively.
4.4.2 Simulation Results
The simulation results under diﬀerent loads of free-riders are shown in Figure 4.4.1.
We ﬁrst illustrate some intriguing ﬁndings which are diﬀerent from the previous
discovery under the IRMs.
• The curve of system performance dg stays relatively ﬂat until a high level
of restricting strangers policy causes dg to decline sharply. Moreover, free-
riders cannot obtain a much higher downloading rate than general peers in
the condition of more preferring to reward strangers (ε < 0.5). The reason is
that in contrast with all resourceable general peers always being recognized
as known peers under the IRMs, some of them are recognized as strangers
under the DRMs. Accordingly, general peers can always be allocated band-
width whenever rewarding stranger policies or restricting stranger policies
are adopted. So the values of d′gs are relatively similar. On the other hand, dg
has a sharp decline because extremely restricting strangers will delay the po-
tential cooperation of general newcomers and consequently reduce the whole
number of uploaders. As a result, the average downloading rate of general
peers is negatively aﬀected. To explain the reduced downloading rate of
free-riders, we believe that some resourceable general peers being recognized
as strangers will compete for downloading bandwidth with free-riders, and
consequently, this competition reduces the average downloading rate of free-
riders. It should be pointed out that the above analysis cannot be evidence
of the DRMs being superior to the IRMs. Since the DRMs reduce the cost
of free-riding when compared with IRMs, they may attract more free-riders
to the system.
99
Chapter 4 Section 4.4
• The overall system performance declines little compared with the signiﬁcant
increase in the load of free-riders. When general peers compete with more
and more free-riders, they obtain less downloading bandwidth and conse-
quently must stay longer in the system to complete their tasks. This con-
versely extends the contribution of general peers to the whole system (This
can be veriﬁed with the growing trend of general peer's average uploading
rate ug shown from Figure 4.4.1(a) to 4.4.1(b) to 4.4.1(c).). As a result,
peers can beneﬁt from general peers' staying longer.
• System fairness also stays relatively ﬂat except when very high levels of re-
stricting strangers is adopted. Even though rewarding stranger policies may
provide beneﬁt to free-riders, they are also able to beneﬁt these resourceable
general peers who are considered strangers. As a result, the concrete values
of Fm under the DRMs in Figure 4.4.1 are higher than those under the IRMs
in Figure 4.3.6 when rewarding stranger policies are assigned.
Certainly, these simulation results also show similarity in some respects to the
previous observations under the IRMs. For example, the highest performance and
best fairness of the system under the DRMs cannot be simultaneously reached.
Speciﬁcally, the extremely restricting stranger policy also brings the best level of
fairness at a cost of performance degradation. The extremely rewarding stranger
policy also leads to the worst fairness. With an increase of free-riding load, both
the system performance and fairness decrease. Thus, a delicate trade-oﬀ in deal-
ing with strangers is also required. In summary, these similar characteristics of
stranger policies under both the IRMs and DRMs will simplify the P2P incentive
design in the future.
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(b) λf = 5
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(c) λf = 10
Figure 4.4.1: Simulation results for diﬀerent stranger policies under the DRMs:
(a) shows the performance dg and fairness Fm as a function of ε (the percent of
uploading bandwidth to known peers) when λg = 5 and λf = 2; (b) is in the
condition of λg = 5 and λf = 5; (c) is in the condition of λg = 5 and λf = 10.
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4.4.3 Case Studies: Stranger Policies in Real P2P File-
Sharing Systems
In this section, we elaborate the accuracy of this simulation model through an-
alyzing the currently most popular P2P ﬁle-sharing systems: BitTorrent and
aMule/eMule, which achieve diﬀerent design goals by adopting diﬀerent stranger
policies.
4.4.3.1 Case Study 1: BitTorrent's Stranger Policy
BitTorrent adopts an incentive mechanism based on TFT strategies [17]. This
incentive policy aims to maintain fairness in exchanging a single ﬁle. With the
TFT incentive policy, each peer independently chooses its content exchange part-
ners according to their current sharing behaviors. The information of generous or
selﬁsh behavior of partners is neither spread nor saved, so BitTorrent's incentive
policy belongs to the DRM. To complete a content exchange process, a resource-
able general peer divides its whole uploading bandwidth into several equal parts.
Following the TFT policy, this resourceable general peer is going to ﬁnd a ﬁxed
number of downloading peers (in the oﬃcial BitTorrent speciﬁcation, this number
is set to 4 by default) and upload to them every 10 seconds. These downloaders,
chosen with the TFT policy, are the peers from whom the resourceable general
peer will obtain data with the highest download rates. In addition, the resource-
able general peer also runs an optimistic unchoking strategy [17] every 30 seconds.
With the optimistic unchoking strategy, one of the current downloaders will be
replaced with a randomly selected requester, even though this requester may not
have exchanged content with the resourceable general peer earlier. The goal of
this unchoking strategy is to discover better potential partners and to promote
newcomers.
Through the above analysis, we can deduct that known peers and strangers are
treated diﬀerently in BitTorrent. The TFT policy is obviously responsible for how
to provide uploading bandwidth to known peers; while the optimistic unchoking
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strategy plays a role of how to allocate partial uploading bandwidth to strangers.
We use partial bandwidth to strangers, not the full bandwidth, because known
peers can also be selected by optimistic unchoking strategy and therefore possess
some probability of receiving uploading bandwidth.
To explore the design goal of BitTorrent's fairness policy, we develop the fol-
lowing simple analysis. We assume the total number of known peers, general
newcomers, and free-riders in the system are nk, nn, and nf respectively. We also
assume the total upload slots of a resourceable peer ism. The percent of uploading
bandwidth to known peers ε can be directly estimated as follows:
ε =
(m− 1) + (2
3
+ 1
3
nk−m
(nk−m)+nn+nf )
m
(4.4.1)
≥ m−
1
3
m
= 0.92 when m = 4.
Our estimated value ε is consistent with the result of the previous work in [70],
where the authors indicated ε is equal to 0.94 by carefully modeling the BitTorrent
protocol. After estimating the value of ε, we can analyze the fairness design
goal in BitTorrent according to our agent-based simulation model. Based on our
simulation results that large values of ε will lead to high fairness, we can conclude
that fairness is preferred to performance in BitTorrent. This conclusion is identical
to the discovery shown in [61], where the authors have mathematically modeled
the design trade-oﬀs of performance and fairness in BitTorrent. Their analysis and
subsequent experiments also revealed that the optimal performance and fairness
in BitTorrent cannot be reached simultaneously, and fairness in BitTorrent is more
emphasized than performance.
Our simulation results also indicate that the large values of ε may bring poor
system performance, which means BitTorrent performance can be further im-
proved. Thus, we believe that BitTorrent performance could still be improved
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when strangers are assigned a little more bandwidth. This can be easily imple-
mented by allocating a few more downloading slots to the optimistic unchoking
strategy, which could consequently reduce the value of ε. Meanwhile, we admit
that BitTorrent's fairness cannot remain at the same level any more as shown in
Figure 4.4.1.
Even though a restricting strangers policy is employed by BitTorrent, previous
works [60, 18] showed that in the real BitTorrent network, free-riders may still
obtain more beneﬁt (df ≥ dg) than general peers. We believe this situation does
not weak the usage of our simulation model. In fact, the beneﬁt of free-riders
shown in these researches comes from other design vulnerabilities of BitTorrent.
For example, there is no limitation regarding the searching for sources frequency for
a single peer in BitTorrent. As a result, free-riders can gather many more sources
than general peers by looking up for sources more often, and accordingly, they can
gain more downloading bandwidth than compliant peers [18]. These vulnerabilities
degrade system fairness even if an extremely restricting stranger policy is adopted.
Therefore, in order to implement a speciﬁc design goal such as keeping the system
fairness in BitTorrent, other appropriate strategies are essentially to be used in
conjunction with the proper stranger policies.
4.4.3.2 Case Study 2: aMule/eMule's Stranger Policy
As another very popular P2P ﬁle-sharing system, aMule/eMule attempts to main-
tain its fairness with a credit-based incentive system. Unlike the TFT policy in
BitTorrent, credit in aMule/eMule is used to maintain the fairness of content ex-
change over a long-term period. The credit system regulates that the unconsumed
credit can reside with peers for several months [8], so peers can use the credit
when they download multiple ﬁles in the future. Since credit operations only exist
between the service provider and its direct service recipients, the fairness policy in
aMule/eMule belongs to DRMs. Considering the few investigations about the fair-
ness strategy of aMule/eMule to strangers, in the following we study the stranger
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policy of aMule/eMule with real world experiments and agent-based simulations.
Design Goal of Fairness Policy to Strangers
The credit system is designed to reward sharing behavior explicitly. Speciﬁcally,
when downloader A ﬁnds uploader B with desired content, A sends downloading
request to B. B, upon receiving the request, will put A into its uploading queue.
A's position in the queue depends on its credit score Cs [16] obtained from B
previously. The credit system uses the following equation to calculate the credit
score:
Cs = Rm × Tc (4.4.2)
In this equation, Tc represents the duration that peer A stays in B's uploading
queue, and Rm denotes the level of the previous contribution from A to B. More
than that, Rm is normalized between 1 and 10, which not only avoids explicitly
punishing any peer, but also tries to promote cooperation of strangers by assigning
Rm = 10 to strangers. In other words, with the same uploading queue staying
time, a stranger will normally obtain higher priority for downloading than a peer
contributing to the uploader as before, but its contribution level is less than 10.
Therefore, we can say that an extremely rewarding stranger policy is employed
in aMule/eMule. According to our simulation results shown in Figure 4.4.1, we
believe that the fairness in aMule/eMule is low, even though its performance
under the current stranger policy can be high. In addition, we have the following
predictions based on our simulation:
• Free-riders will have similar average downloading rates as general peers in
aMule/eMule.
• The uploading rate of general peers is much higher than its downloading
rate.
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• Improving system fairness gradually will avoid a large reduction of system
performance.
Experiment in Real aMule/eMule
To verify our prediction, we develop an experimental study in the real aMule/eMule.
• To implement a free-rider client, we modiﬁed one of the popular client ver-
sions of aMule/eMule, eMule v0.49C. This modiﬁed client will only down-
load content from others and will not upload content at all. We also use an
unmodiﬁed client eMule v0.49C to represent the general peer. These two
clients are set up to have the same download capacity and upload capacity.
They are separately installed on two computers with the same conﬁguration
in the same local network.
• After choosing the same desired content, we enabled these two peers to
join the real network at the same time and leave the system when their
downloading jobs were completed. Using the sources searching algorithm
in aMule/eMule, both peers randomly selected their partners with diﬀerent
uploading/downloading capacities and diﬀerent distances during the tests.
At the end of the downloading process, each peer's average downloading rate
and average uploading rate were calculated.
As the credit system tries to maintain fairness among single ﬁle/multiple ﬁles
downloading processes over a long time period, we accordingly implement seven
diﬀerent tests. Tests 1-5 represent measuring the downloading process of a single
ﬁle with diﬀerent sizes; Tests 6 and 7 represent measuring the downloading process
of multiple ﬁles within a long-term period. In addition, in our tests the general
peer and the free-rider are assigned non-credit at the beginning of tests, so we can
evaluate our prediction with the same credit baseline for both of these two peers.
For the ﬁrst 5 tests, the total amount of downloading content is within 100MB,
100-300MB, 300-600MB, 600-900MB, and 900-1800MB respectively. To keep the
test accurate, we test each of them multiple times and sample a wide range of
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downloading material of diﬀerent types of popular non-copyright content (free
Audio, free Video, free Books, etc.) for each trial. After each download, the
content is moved out of the sharing folder, and the test peers' IDs are randomly
recreated to remove the previous credit eﬀect.
For the sixth test, we select a very popular Asian TV show series (15 episodes)
which are new and published online on and oﬀ for about two months as the
downloading resources. The total amount of downloading content is 4250MB. For
the seventh test, the downloaded content is selected more generally from a large
scope of popular non-copyright materials with diﬀerent sizes. The total amount
of content is 6040MB, and the total test time is about one month. During both of
these two tests, each peer's ID is retained until they downloaded the last piece of
content. Since the free-rider client does not change its ID during these two tests,
these tests also attempts to verify our prediction: under the DRM free-riders do
not need to whitewash.
Experimental Results
The experiments in the real aMule/eMule took place over more than two months
from August 2009 to October 2009. Each peer downloaded over 100GB content.
The experimental results are shown in Table 4.3, Table 4.4, Table 4.5, and Figure
4.4.2 respectively. As predicted with our simulation model, we ﬁnd that under the
extremely rewarding stranger policy:
• the free-rider receives a very similar average downloading rate as the general
peer,
• and the average uploading rate of the general peer is much higher than its
average downloading rate.
The accuracy of the simulation model is veriﬁed again by the match of the ex-
perimental results and our predictions. On the other hand, a concern about the
eﬃciency of the fairness policy in aMule/eMule may be issued due to the ease of
free-riding. Our simulation results indicate to set the value of ε relatively larger
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Table 4.3: Test results in aMule/eMule
Test No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of
Chunks
≤10 10~32 32~65 65~97 97~194 461~563 71~699
Total Amount
(MB)
0 ~ 100 100 ~ 300 300 ~ 600 600 ~ 900 900~1800 4250 6040
Test Trials 32 36 31 32 36 1 1
General Peer's
Avg. Source No.
110 177 245 556 167 232 223
Free-Rider's Avg.
Source No.
101 186 249 506 152 228 210
General Peer's
Avg. Download
Rate (KB/s)
17.84 30.23 32.44 65.96 42.08 47.5 35.18
General Peer's
Avg. Upload
Rate (KB/s)
35.4 85.2 144.4 118.4 83.0 85.6 60.43
Free-Rider's Avg.
Download Rate
(KB/s)
17.14 31.46 29.19 52.67 36.39 49 37.63
Free-Rider's Avg.
Upload Rate
(KB/s)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
can mitigate this problem. That is, increasing the value of ε can restrict free-riding
as well as to maintain the same level of system performance. This mitigation can
be easily implemented in aMule/eMule, if each resourceable peer adaptively ad-
justs the value of the modiﬁer Rm assigned to its strangers, instead of directly
giving the maximum value 10 to them.
Fairness vs. Performance for aMule/eMule
With the prediction of our simulation results, we can avoid largely decreasing
system performance while gradually improving system fairness. To control free-
riding behavior, we could require each resourceable peer to adaptively adjust the
value of the modiﬁer Rm assigned to its strangers, instead of directly assigning the
maximum value 10. That is, giving more uploading bandwidth to known peers.
By simulating aMule/eMule through the agent-based technology, we verify the
impact of changing the stranger policies on the system performance. The simula-
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Table 4.4: Detailed results of test 6 in aMule/eMule
Trial No. File Size (MB) General Peer's
Download
Rate (KB/s)
General Peer's
Upload Rate
(KB/s)
Free-Rider's
Download
Rate (KB/s)
1 295 31.59 81.12 26.68
2 328 42.18 84.46 44.31
3 348 67.31 87.26 79.09
4 311 40.88 88.99 42.25
5 293 64.72 89.09 55.98
6 315 45.65 84.62 55.38
7 286 51.02 86.22 59.6
8 305 48.19 87.98 48.85
9 289 65.65 81.84 66.4
10 299 35.67 89.26 35.16
11 296 33.74 74.33 25.47
12 296 55.25 86.46 58.94
13 288 44.38 85.42 49.91
14 286 42.54 85.93 42.98
15 289 43.75 87.81 44.56
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Figure 4.4.2: (a) general peer's average downloading rate vs. its average uploading
rate; (b) general peer's average downloading rate vs. free-rider's average down-
loading rate
tor comprises two components: one ED2K index server node, and client nodes of
aMule/eMule. The server node undertakes the publication of sharing content in-
formation and maintains the list of on-line nodes. Each client node independently
exchanges content with others by running most of the functions of the client soft-
ware of aMule/eMule. For example, each node in the simulator maintains its
uploads by queuing technology. Each node will also perform aMule/eMule's in-
herent source searching methods such as eD2K server mehtod, Source-Exchange
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Table 4.5: Detailed results of test 7 in aMule/eMule
Trial No. File Size (MB) General Peer's
Download
Rate (KB/s)
General Peer's
Upload Rate
(KB/s)
Free-Rider's
Download
Rate (KB/s)
1 388 62.12 102.19 92.88
2 427 19.19 30.18 41.78
3 433 14.37 30.23 12.38
4 394 41.29 66.36 29.7
5 328 56.26 78.01 55.22
6 377 5.46 10.00 4.95
7 365 31.86 55.49 23.91
8 348 38.59 70.66 48.15
9 385 25.84 52.37 28.59
10 419 61.01 110.08 60.02
11 364 38.63 50.95 34.21
12 446 28.93 55.77 25.6
13 407 7.64 12.27 6.5
14 347 16.25 35.05 58.78
15 135 17 30.22 15.24
16 252 55.15 55.15 57.72
17 699 60.41 97.85 63.73
18 74 31.75 70.24 23.24
19 71 18.15 40.33 15.62
20 277 73.71 155.20 53.3
Average 302 35.18 60.43 37.63
method, and Passive method to locate content sources. Since currently few use-
ful sources can be obtained from the KAD network, we choose to not implement
the KAD network function in the simulation. On the other hand, to evaluate
the diﬀerent impacts of stranger policies on system performance, we fully imple-
mented the function of the credit system of aMule/eMule. As a result, general
peers sharing diﬀerent amount of content are assigned diﬀerent credit values.
Simulation Setup
We introduced 10,000 client nodes and a single ED2K index server node into
our simulation. The server node was always on-line, while the client nodes were
randomly on-line or oﬀ-line. For these clients, 10 percent of them are free-riders,
and the others are general peers. To simplify the simulation and concentrate on
evaluating the stranger policies, we assigned each client node the same download
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and upload bandwidth, 20KB/second. In the simulation, each client node must
download a total of 48 ﬁles of the same size, 1000KB. The simulation time slot
was deﬁned as 100 seconds. At the beginning of each simulation, 100 general peers
were already on-line in the system, and each of them randomly shared a diﬀerent
number of ﬁles, while the maximum numbers of shareable ﬁles were limited to
48. Every general peer performed content exchange processes according to the
sequence: ﬁrst discovering sources via diﬀerent sources searching algorithms, and
then both downloading from these sources and sharing ﬁles to other peers; while
every free-rider did the same steps except for uploading their content. The peers
ﬁnishing a ﬁle download might be continuously on-line to download the next ﬁle, or
temporarily oﬀ-line with 2 time slots (200 seconds) on average, and then resuming
the task again. This process kept running until the peers completed the whole
task and chose to be permanently oﬀ-line.
To verify the prediction of our simulation model, we simply test two stranger
policies for comparison. One is the original policy where strangers are given the
maximum value of Rm: 10. The other one is the kindly restricting stranger policy
where strangers are given the value of Rm: 5. Since we still keep the maximum
value of Rm: 10, this setting will give less uploading bandwidth to strangers.
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Figure 4.4.3: Simulation result showing a general peer's downloading rate vs. a
free-rider's downloading rate
The simulation result is shown in Figure 4.4.3. With less uploading rate given
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to strangers, the average downloading rate of general peers is not reduced too
much, while the average downloading rate of free-riders has a noticeable decrease.
Again, this simulation veriﬁes our prediction that improving system fairness grad-
ually will avoid the large reduction of system performance. However, simply reduc-
ing uploading bandwidth to strangers cannot entirely solve the free-riding issue,
because free-riders can still obtain enough beneﬁt from other design issues in the
P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. For example, as we mentioned earlier, free-riders in the
BitTorrent network can obtain similar downloading rate as general peers by col-
lecting more downloading sources. Similarly, free-riders in aMule/eMule can also
collect much more sources than general peers. To solve this issue, our previous
work [45] proposed a novel free-riding control scheme for strengthening system
fairness, and the details are shown in Appendix A.
In the real world, users may feel that the downloading rate in BitTorrent is
higher than that in aMule/eMule, even though the performance is further em-
phasized in aMule/eMule. The reason is that system performance is also aﬀected
by other factors, e.g. the chunk size of a ﬁle and the eﬃciency of the searching
downloading sources. A previous study in [71] pointed out that the overlarge of
the chunk size (over 2MB) in P2P ﬁle-sharing networks will signiﬁcantly reduce
system performance. Correspondingly, the chunk size of a ﬁle is deﬁned as 256KB
in BitTorrent, while 9.28MB in aMule/eMule. So again, to develop a successful
P2P ﬁle-sharing system, other appropriate strategies are essentially to be used in
conjunction with an appropriate stranger policies.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focuses on better understanding the challenge of designing
stranger policies in a general P2P ﬁle-sharing system with an open environment.
Current P2P systems use reciprocity-based incentive mechanisms to maintain sys-
tem fairness. However, since free-riders/whitewashers cannot easily be distin-
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guished from general newcomers, inappropriately treating strangers may reduce
system performance or fairness. Therefore, the impact of a broad range of stranger
policies from extremely rewarding strangers to extremely restricting them is evalu-
ated under the indirect reciprocity incentive mechanism and the direct reciprocity
incentive mechanism.
• In the case of indirect reciprocity incentive mechanisms being used, both an
analytical model and an agent-based simulation are adopted for evaluation.
Performance and fairness as functions of stranger policies are shown in Figure
4.3.6 and are characterized by speciﬁc behaviors. The highest performance
of the system is obtained when both known peers and strangers are allocated
some bandwidth, and accordingly free-riders will survive. Correspondingly,
the best fairness is obtained when the extremely restricting stranger policy
is used. Thus, highest performance and best fairness cannot be reached at
the same time.
• In the case of the direct reciprocity incentive mechanism being used, an
agent-based simulation model is developed. The simulation results reveal
that the system performance and fairness have gradually change under dif-
ferent stranger policies except when extremely restricting strangers (Figure
4.4.1). When the extremely restricting stranger policy is applied, systems
will obtain the best fairness but the lowest performance. When the ex-
tremely rewarding stranger policy is applied, systems almost achieve their
highest performance. This simulation model also provides insight on diﬀerent
design emphases for dealing with strangers in BitTorrent and aMule/eMule.
Through two case studies, we verify the prediction from our simulation re-
sults that strangers are extremely restricted in BitTorrent while extremely
rewarded in aMule/eMule.
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Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation focuses on several research challenges on P2P fairness. In this
chapter, we summarize the main results obtained in studying these research prob-
lems, and then we suggest possible future work for additional research topics.
5.1 Conclusions
Maintaining fairness is necessary in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. In this dissertation,
we study P2P ﬁle-sharing fairness issues: the issue of maintaining fairness during
the content information publishing/retrieving process and the issue of designing
eﬀective stranger policies on P2P fairness.
5.1.1 The Necessity of Fairness Maintenance During The
Content Information Publishing/Retrieving Process
Exchanging content in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems includes two fundamental steps:
the process of publishing/retrieving content information and the process of ex-
changing real content with other peers. While maintaining fairness for real con-
tent exchange has been widely studied, the necessity of maintaining fairness for
the content information publishing/retrieving process has been overlooked.
In Chapter 3, through experiments in the KAD network, we attempt to analyze
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the necessity of maintaining fairness during the content information lookup pro-
cess in P2P networks. We conduct several large-scale measurements to analyze the
maintenance of both routing and publishing tables which are the key components
in the publishing/retrieving process. By deploying our distributed measurement
framework on the PlanetLab testbed, we ﬁrst test the availability and the simi-
larity of peers' routing tables. Our results show that on average more than 80%
of nodes in the routing table are online and less than 25% of records are the same
among diﬀerent routing tables of peers belonging to a searching tolerance zone.
This means that the routing table is well maintained, and a peer can use it to ﬁnd
desired peers easily. After that, we measure the SLI publishing table and ﬁnd that
on average only around 25% of items in this table are online. Furthermore, our
measurement reveals that over 75% of peers leave the system within one hour after
publishing content. By analyzing the KAD protocol, we discover that the current
maintenance method for the publishing table, the poorly designed incentive policy,
and the selﬁshness of the publishing peer are the reasons for the low availability
of the publishing table. Consequently, these reasons cause the poor lookup per-
formance of the KAD network. Therefore, our experiments' results show that the
system, designed for helping users publish and retrieve content information, could
be almost useless, if it lacks an eﬀective incentive policy. Based on our discoveries,
we propose three possible schemes to improve the lookup performance.
5.1.2 Stranger Policies on P2P Fairness
Since strangers in P2P ﬁle-sharing systems can be either general peers or free-
riders, when designing a stranger policy, restricting strangers is not necessarily
better/worse than rewarding strangers for system performance and fairness. How-
ever, few quantitative evaluations for diﬀerent stranger policies currently exist in
literature.
In Chapter 4, we focus on better understanding the challenge of designing
stranger policies in a general P2P ﬁle-sharing system with an open environment.
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Current P2P systems either solely reward strangers or restrict them alternatively,
which may reduce system performance or fairness. In the case of the indirect
reciprocity incentive mechanism being used, we adopt both a numerical analysis
and an agent-based simulation to evaluate the impact of a broad range of stranger
policies from extremely rewarding strangers to extremely restricting them. We
found the highest performance and the best fairness cannot be reached at the
same time. The highest performance of the system is obtained when some band-
width is allocated to both known peers and strangers, and accordingly, free-riders
will survive. Correspondingly, the best fairness is obtained when the extremely
restricting stranger policy is used. In the case of the direct reciprocity incentive
mechanism being used, we design an agent-based simulation model and use it to
reveal that the system performance and fairness changed gradually under diﬀerent
stranger policies except when extremely restricting strangers. We ﬁnd that sys-
tems will obtain the best fairness, but the lowest performance when an extremely
restricting stranger policy is applied. On the other hand, systems almost achieve
their highest performance when an extremely rewarding stranger policy is applied.
With this simulation model, we can also predict the diﬀerent design emphases for
dealing with strangers in BitTorrent and aMule/eMule, where strangers are ex-
tremely restricted in BitTorrent while extremely rewarded in aMule/eMule. These
predictions are veriﬁed with experimental studies and agent-based simulations.
5.2 Future Work
In the future, the possible research topics in maintaining fairness of the content
information publishing/retrieving process in the KAD network and on the design
of stranger policies can be directed as follows.
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5.2.1 Future work on studying fairness design in KAD net-
work
According to several possible improvements discussed in Chapter 3 on overcoming
low lookup eﬃciency in the KAD network, future work can be to study the impacts
of these modiﬁcations on the KAD performance through quantitative analysis or
simulation. Moreover, additional work has to been done on designing an eﬃcient
incentive policy for the KAD network. In order to achieve this task, designers may
need to answer the following questions:
• which kind of incentive scheme (e.g. incenting generous behavior of peers
through monetary payment or through reciprocity trading) should be em-
ployed?
• How can we eﬀectively alleviate selﬁsh behavior and prolong peers' staying
time?
• To implement the fairness policy, should the fully distributed infrastructure
of the KAD network be maintained? Or should some central control nodes
be introduced into the system?
• Can the new designed fairness policy been easily implemented in the current
KAD network?
5.2.2 Future Work on Studying Stranger Policies
Our studies covers the stranger policies under both the IRM and the DRM. How-
ever, there still exists a potential research direction: the stranger policies under
regional incentive mechanisms. Regional incentive mechanisms have just been pro-
posed recently in [38, 41], where the historical behavior of a peer could be spread
within a limited scope. Since dealing with strangers bring additional complexity to
fairness design, it is necessary to consider the possibility of distinguishing general
strangers from free-riding strangers. For example,
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• is the popular social network technology helpful in distinguishing strangers
in a P2P ﬁle-sharing system?
• Which kind of technology is suitable for analyzing stranger policies under
the regional incentive mechanisms?
Another possible research direction is to improve the accuracy of both our ana-
lytical and simulation model. For example,
• in the analysis model, we assume peers' arrival according to the Poisson
distribution. In reality, the arrival pattern may also be aﬀected by the
content popularity. Thus, other possible distributions should be considered
when modeling the arrival of peers.
• We also assume peers will stay into the system until they complete the entire
task. However, due to some uncontrollable reasons, peers may permanently
leave the system during the downloading process. Considering this situation
will also bring more accuracy to our model.
• In the simulation model, the simulation ability of our method may be lim-
ited by the central node. However, this situation can be mitigated through
distributed simulation methods. With the introduction of additional super
nodes, the original simulation structure can be replaced by a new hierar-
chical distributed structure, so the scalability of simulation system will be
expended and the delay of simulation will be reduced.
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Appendix A
A new free-riding control scheme
To deal with free-riding behavior, we could require each resourceable peer adap-
tively adjusts the value of the modiﬁer Rm assigned to its strangers, instead of
directly giving the maximum value 10 to them. That is, give more uploading
bandwidth to known peers. However, this strategy cannot entirely solve the free-
riding issue, because free-riders can still obtain enough beneﬁt from the other
design issues in the P2P ﬁle-sharing systems. For example, as we mentioned ear-
lier, free-riders in the BitTorrent network can obtain similar downloading rate
as general peers by collecting more downloading sources. Similarly, free-riders in
aMule/eMule can also collect much more sources than general peers. To solve
this issue, we propose a novel free-riding control scheme for strengthening system
fairness.
As we mentioned in the background section, two steps are necessary to com-
plete the downloading task: one is to ﬁnd the content sources at ﬁrst, and then
downloading the content from these sources. Since more download sources usually
means higher download rate in P2P ﬁle sharing networks, the basic concept of our
control scheme is to assign diﬀerent number of sources to each peer according to
its credit. Therefore, not only would contributors be rewarded with credit but also
free-riders would be penalized by the restricted knowledge of available sources.
Our policy for allocating source information is based on the credit of peers.
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After receiving sources requests, the general peer will return a diﬀerent number of
sources according to the credit that the requester has. The detailed policy is as
follows.
• For the requester who contributed enough content to this general peer, i.e.,
the credit earned from this general peer is high, the general peer would
provide all its known sources information. To judge whether the requester's
contribution is enough, we can require the general peer to use a threshold
like the average credit value of its former service providers as the judgment
metric.
• For the requester whose credit value is lower than the threshold or with-
out credit, the number of returned sources from this general peer would
be proportional to the requester's credit. This rule addresses the situation
of rate-limit contributions, where peers prefer to control their upload rate
according to their download rate.
• For the strangers who has no documented data-exchange, i.e., it hasn't any
credit, the general peer will return only very few sources to this free-riding
suspect. Moreover, it also concurrently assigns a negative credit to such
a suspect. The negative credit, which is stored by the general peer itself,
will become positive if suspects show sharing behavior, or will become more
negative as the suspect continues only to ask for sources. When the nega-
tive credit reaches a pre-deﬁned value, e.g., negative three (the suspect has
requested three times without contribution), the suspect will be judged as a
free-rider and eligible for no more source information.
• Since we want to treat the general newcomer diﬀerently from a real free-
rider (yet as the general newcomer has no shareable content, consequently
it could be considered a free-rider), the general peer still provides sources
rather than none to the stranger in the new scheme. However, the free-
rider may avoid the punishment through the whitewashing attack where it
128
repeatedly change new identities[9], we require the general peer returns the
same source information each time to every free-riding suspect, no matter
what the suspect's ID is. Thus, diﬀerent IDs can't beneﬁt the free-rider any
more. On the other hand, we admit that this scheme may delay the general
newcomer's downloading progress, the limitation will disappear when the
newcomer begins to share content.
Based on the main searching methods in aMule/eMule, our scheme can deal with
the possible situation that free-riders may obtain enough sources through iter-
atively requesting their known resources. Under the Passive method, general
peers agree to be sources of a requester only if this requester has their credit.
Free-riders cannot obtain beneﬁt from this Passive method. Under the Source-
Exchange method, not only free-riders but also general peers will iteratively ask
for more sources from their already known sources. Since our free-riding control
scheme limits the number of returned peers to free-riding suspects (for example,
only 10% back to suspects in contrast with 100% return to general peers), the
number of sources obtained by general peers should be much larger than that
obtained by free-riders. As a result, this could ensure that free-riders have less
beneﬁt than general peers. Furthermore, with the Source-Exchange method, we
can naturally avoid the side-eﬀect of the churn phenomenon, which may block a
general peer when its sources are oﬀ-line. Instead of requesting a list of sources
from one special peer, the Source-Exchange method helps peers actively and it-
eratively searches additional sources. Therefore, a general peer can still ﬁnd out
other online sources from its already known lists of sources who have assigned
enough credit to it, even though it may be blocked by a special peer.
Of course, we can limit the total number of sources that free-riders can obtain
in a special time period, but all those methods have their own advantages and
disadvantages. For example:
1. instead of returning its known sources to the strangers at once, the requested
peer will answer its strangers' requests after a special time interval. This can
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delay the free-riders' ability to obtain sources quickly, and accordingly help
the general peers join the uploaders uploading queue earlier than free-riders
on average. However, it may also aﬀect the general peers beneﬁt when they
are considered to be free-riding suspects;
2. to answer the requests from free-riding suspects, each requested peer can
independently map the name of the requested ﬁle into an IP address format
using a consistent map function. Then based on the knowledge of this same
fundamental IP address, each requested peer selects its known sources whose
IPs are among the closest to this IP address as their reply. This method can
give free-riders almost the same sources no matter which nodes they request.
However, it also increases the burden of those chosen sources;
3. each requested peer can return few sources to free-riding suspects, but this
will postpone general newcomers potential contributing behavior, and ac-
cordingly reduces the system performance.
We admit that our scheme is a free-riding control method and not a free-riding
removal method. Free-riders can still obtain information about some sources un-
der this scheme. The reason is our scheme attempts to limit their beneﬁt without
modifying the infrastructure of aMule/eMule. Currently, the aMule/eMule is fully
distributed and it has not any central control nodes. Moreover, the local knowl-
edge of each peer is neither spread nor synchronized among other peers. This
infrastructure makes the implementation of eMule/eDonkey simple and reduces
the network traﬃc. Meanwhile, it cannot reliably ﬁght selﬁsh behavior or reward
generous behavior, because neither free-riding nor contributing to one peer can be
observed by other peers. To mitigate this issue, a global incentive policy can be
an alternative of the local incentive policy, but it is more complicated even though
it may be more eﬃcient. Considering the success of aMule/eMule, our goal in this
scheme is to keep its infrastructure unchanged and to try to ﬁnd a trade-oﬀ be-
tween controlling free-riding and maintaining system performance. Consequently,
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Figure A.0.1: Simulation results. The average download time of general peers
and fairness ratio R with diﬀerent values of control parameter β: (a) β =1; (b)
β = 0.1.
this scheme also inherits the weaknesses of the local infrastructure of aMule/eMule,
which does not allow fully removal of free-riders as well as restricting some general
peers. However, this free-riding control policy remains simple, and the basic local
structure of the credit system is unaﬀected, and the modiﬁcation will be easy to
implement in aMule/eMule.
To test the ability of the new scheme to deal with free-riding behavior, we
also implemented the scheme into our agent-based simulation: ﬁrst, the index
server node will provide only a few initial sources to new coming peers and will
no longer reply to repeated requests. Next, for the Sources Exchange method,
we required the general peer to return all its known sources to peers with its
credit, and to give the same small fraction of its known sources to peers without
its credit. Again, remembering a suspect by a new additional ﬁeld in the local
database, peers will refuse to reply after being requested three times by such a
suspect. For the Passive method, general peers agree to be the sources only for
the peers having their credit. Even though we haven't implemented the KAD
network in our simulation, the modiﬁcation could easily be applied in the KAD
method, which has the same operation pattern as the Sources Exchange method.
To run the simulation, we required the general peer to return 10 percent of its
total known sources to the free-riding suspects.
Our simulation results are shown in Figure. A.0.1. They indicates the validity
131
of our modiﬁcation for controlling free-riding behavior, i.e., free-riders have to
endure a signiﬁcant delay in average download time in contrast to general peers.
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Appendix B
Ping-pong message
The ping-pong message in aMule/eMule is used for testing the online status of
peers. As Figure B.0.1 shown, peers in aMule/eMule can send a special hello-
request message to other peers. If a hello-reply message can be received, the
requested peer is proved online. The KAD protocol messages are transferred with
UDP protocol. A special part of message called opcode is inserted after the
UDP header. The hello-request message uses the opcode 0x10, and the hello-reply
message uses the opcode 0x18.
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Figure B.0.1: Ping-pong message in the KAD network
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